

# The future for central bank balance sheets and their use for macroprudential policy

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# To what extent will central banks unwind QE?

Maybe less than you think. 3 reasons:

- Monetary effects already unwound?
- Financial system no longer dysfunctional?
- The effect of the new liquidity and capital regimes.

This presentation is mainly focused on the latter.

# What is the optimal size of a central bank balance sheet?

- Normally liability driven. But under QE has been asset driven with central banks choosing the supply of money and not caring much about interest rates going lower.
- Case for doing that has long since passed:
  - Real effects of increases in supply of money are mostly temporary. Most should have unwound by now.
  - Impact of changing asset composition in system was most powerful ie temporary effects may have been sustained - when markets were dysfunctional. That's no longer the case.


# What is the optimal size of a central bank balance sheet?

- Normally liability driven. Demand function for central bank money should determine balance sheet size, given a policy rate and level of transactions in economy.
- Issues:
  - Interest elasticity of demand for notes has always been measured imprecisely.
  - Structural break caused by QE - proportion of notes vs reserves dramatically altered.
  - Structural shifts & trends in demand for notes.
  - Structural shifts & trends in demand for reserves.


# Expanded central bank balance sheet

## Federal Reserve

### Liabilities



### Assets



# The new liquidity regime will have increased demand for reserves

- **Liquidity Coverage Ratio** – hold HQLA to meet stressed cash outflow over 30 days  
*ie hold liquid assets against liabilities that might run.*
- **Net Stable Funding Ratio** – hold stable funding for illiquid assets  
*ie hold long-term liabilities against assets that could not be sold.*


## Interact with capital regime via:

- **Leverage ratio** – capital requirement based on unweighted assets.  
*Liquid assets may count in the latter .....*

# Balance sheet choices can impact on financial stability via LCR, NSFR, Leverage Ratio

- Size = demand for reserves? (LCR, LR) **Unknown.**
- Excess vs shortage. Floor system vs corridor. Access (next chart).
- Composition: loans vs outright purchases.
- Purchases: bank assets vs non-bank, HQLA vs non.
- Collateral eligibility: HQLA vs non-HQLA.
- Term of loans (chart).
- Do reserves count in leverage ratio? Shouldn't ....

# Expansion of access to the central bank balance sheet: Bank of England




Source: 2018  
IEO report,  
Bank of England



# Term 'funding' from the Bank of England

Outstanding amounts lent in SMF liquidity facilities, the FLS and TFS, 2012–17



Source: 2018  
IEO report,  
Bank of England

# Conclusions

- CB balance sheet choices will affect *monetary conditions* – but less now than when expanding ie much of the effect should have already worn off.
- Room to unwind may be determined by a structural increase in demand for reserve balances. May have to react to market signals.
- CB balance sheet implementation has become more important because of impact on regulatory metrics for banks and hence *financial stability*.
- So the central bank balance sheet has become a major *macroprudential* tool. (Which is helpful given a shortage of such tools.)
- All central banks need to be given, and be clear about, their *financial stability mandate* to guide these choices.