

Pass-Through of Exchange Rates and Import Prices to Domestic Inflation in Some Industrialized Economies*

Jonathan McCarthy
Domestic Research Department
Federal Reserve Bank of New York

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Abstract

This paper examines the impact of exchange rates and import prices on domestic PPI and CPI in selected industrialized economies. The empirical model is a VAR incorporating a distribution chain of pricing. Impulse responses and variance decompositions indicate that these external factors have a modest effect on domestic price inflation over the post-Bretton Woods era. The pass-through is somewhat stronger in countries with a larger import share. A historical decomposition over 1996-98 indicates, however, that external factors have had a sizable disinflationary effect in most of the countries during these past couple years. Estimating the model using post-1982 data has little effect on these conclusions.

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1 Introduction

Inflation rates in the industrialized economies have been declining in recent years, even though some of these countries have had lengthy economic expansions. This inflation behavior thus appears to be quite different from that of the 1970s and 1980s as well as contrary to standard paradigms of inflation and economic activity. For example, the inflation rate in the US has continued to decline even as the unemployment rate has fallen below levels associated with rising inflation during the previous two decades.

Because the recent relationship between inflation and economic activity has been surprising, pundits have advanced many hypotheses to explain this phenomenon. One hypothesis in particular to explain the US and UK experience has been the disinflationary impact of exchange rate appreciation and import price deflation. In addition, analysts have pointed to the greater openness of the US economy as indicative of increased foreign competitive pressures limiting US domestic inflation.

Recent events have increased interest in the effect of external influences on domestic inflation. Many analysts have pointed to the general decline in import prices in industrialized economies, partly the result of the glut of goods induced by the 1997-98 East Asian crisis, to explain declining inflation in these countries during the past couple of years. Some analysts even have claimed that the greater openness of the industrialized economies, in particular the US, implies that domestic measures of capacity constraints have become largely *passé*, and that global capacity measures are more important.¹ In contrast, many analysts have expressed concern that, as other countries recover from the crisis, an US dollar depreciation and higher import prices will lead to greater US inflationary pressures.

Because this subject has both policy and theoretical implications, it has spawned many studies through the years. Most of these studies have concentrated on the pass-through of a country's exchange rate fluctuations to its import prices, a literature that has been surveyed comprehensively by Goldberg and Knetter (1997).² There have been fewer studies on the pass-through from exchange rate and import price fluctuations to domestic producer and consumer prices, the most prominent being Feinberg (1986, 1989) and Woo (1984).

More recently, several studies have examined further the influences of exchange rates and import prices on domestic inflation. Kim (1998) uses a vector error correction model and finds that in the US, the exchange rate has the expected negative long-run effect on the producer price index (PPI). However, his work does not address the relationship at shorter horizons more relevant for monetary policy.³ In this regard,

¹For an analysis that refutes some of these claims, see Tootell (1998).

²In addition, much has been written concerning the related issue of the extent to which exporters adjust their profit margins in response to exchange rate fluctuations. One such recent paper is Klitgaard (1999).

³Furthermore, my attempts at replicating his results indicated that they were sensitive to the

Dellmo (1996) finds that the effect of import prices on the consumer price index (CPI) in Swedish data is relatively weak, even though Sweden is a small open economy. In the case of the large, relatively closed US economy, the evidence is mixed concerning the pass-through to domestic CPI inflation. Tootell (1998) finds that measures of foreign capacity do not enter significantly into estimates of the US Phillips curve. In contrast, Koenig (1998) and Boldin (1998) both find that including import prices in a simple CPI inflation forecasting model improves forecasts during the 1990s.

This paper further examines the pass-through of external factors to domestic inflation. Unlike the previously cited papers, it uses a VAR model that permits one to track pass-through from exchange fluctuations to each stage of the distribution chain in a simple integrated framework. In addition, I estimate the model for several industrialized economies and then examine whether the factors affecting pass-through that have been identified in the industry-level studies also explain cross-country differences in pass-through. By estimating the model over different periods of the post-Bretton Woods era, I investigate whether supposedly greater globalization has affected the pass-through. Finally, I use the model to examine the effect of exchange rates and import prices on domestic inflation in these countries from 1996 through 1998.

To preview the results, the impulse response functions and variance decompositions indicate that exchange rate and import price shocks have modest effects on domestic inflation in most of the countries in the sample, particularly the larger economies. Openness as measured by the import share of domestic demand in a country is correlated across countries with the some measures of the pass-through, but the association is not particularly strong. Concentrating on influences over the last couple of years indicates that external factors have had a sizable disinflationary effect over this period. Finally, estimating the model for different sample periods does not suggest stronger pass-through in the 1980s and 1990s than previously.

The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. The next section discusses some influences on pass-through that have been identified in previous studies and that may explain cross-country differences in pass-through. Section 3 describes the model and its empirical implementation, and Section 4 the data used in the study. Section 5 provides the results from the impulse responses and variance decompositions. Section 6 discusses the historical decomposition of the 1996-98 period and Section 7 the issue of possible time-varying pass-through. Section 8 concludes.

2 Influences on Pass-Through

There have been many papers that have examined pass-through of exchange rate fluctuations to import prices as well as some that have examined pass-through to domestic producer and consumer prices. In this section, I briefly discuss some factors

specification of the model.

identified by these studies that may underlie variations in pass-through and how these relate to cross-country differences in pass-through.

Many recent studies have concentrated on the relationship between an industry's characteristics and the pass-through of exchange rate fluctuations in that industry. The theoretical basis for many of these studies has come from papers such as Dornbusch (1987) that applied industrial organization models to explain the relationship between exchange rate fluctuations and domestic price changes in terms of market concentration, import penetration, and the substitutability of imported and domestic products. Utilizing these principles, Feinberg (1986, 1989) finds exchange rate pass-through to domestic producer prices in both the US and Germany is greater in industries that were less concentrated and faced greater import penetration. More generally, Goldberg and Knetter (1997) find that many studies have concluded that greater import price pass-through has occurred in more segmented industries—that is, industries where firms are able to engage in third degree price discrimination.

What do these results imply for differences in pass-through across countries? First, assuming that a country's import share is a good proxy for the import penetration faced by firms, then countries with a larger import share should have a greater pass-through of exchange rate and import price fluctuations to domestic prices. Second, both because of a direct effect as well as through a greater pass-through, we would expect that exchange rates and import prices should become more important in explaining domestic inflation fluctuations as the import share increases.

Relating the industrial organization characteristics of concentration and market segmentation to the country level is more difficult. In this study, I will examine how a country's "competitiveness" as measured by the Global Competitiveness Report from the World Economic Forum (1999) correlates with the extent of pass-through and the importance of exchange rates and import price in explaining domestic inflation fluctuations.

In regards to other influences, Mann (1986) discusses some macroeconomic factors that may affect pass-through. One such factor is exchange rate volatility. Greater exchange rate volatility may make importers more wary of changing prices and more willing to adjust profit margins, thus reducing measured pass-through. Some empirical evidence confirming this hypothesis at the sectoral and product level has been provided by Wei and Parsley (1995) and Engel and Rogers (1998). Thus we would expect that pass-through should be less in countries where the exchange rate has been more volatile.

Another macroeconomic factor discussed by Mann (1986) is aggregate demand uncertainty. Aggregate demand shifts in conjunction with exchange rate fluctuations will alter the profit margins of importers in an imperfectly competitive environment, thus reducing measured pass-through. If this hypothesis is true, we would expect that pass-through should be less in countries where aggregate demand (which will be proxied by the output gap) is more volatile.

To examine these hypotheses concerning the pass-through of exchange rate and import price fluctuations to domestic inflation, an empirical model to measure pass-through is needed. The model used in this study is presented in the next section.

3 Model and Methodology

To examine the pass-through of exchange rate and import price fluctuations to domestic producer and consumer inflation, I use a model of pricing along a distribution chain. In this model, inflation at a particular distribution stage—import, producer, and consumer—in period t is assumed to be comprised of several different components. The first component is the expected inflation at that stage based on the available information at the end of period $t - 1$. The second and third are the effects of period t domestic “supply” and “demand” shocks on inflation at that stage. The fourth component is the effect of external exchange rate shocks on inflation at a particular stage. Next are the effect of inflation shocks at the previous stages of the distribution chain. Finally, there is the inflation shock at that particular stage.

The inflation shocks at each stage is simply that portion of that stage’s inflation which cannot be explained using information from period $t - 1$ plus information about domestic supply and demand variables, exchange rates, and period t inflation at previous stages of the distribution cycle. These shocks thus can be thought of as changes in the pricing power and markups of firms at these stages. Two other features of the model are worthy of note. First, the model allows import inflation shocks to affect domestic consumer inflation both directly and indirectly through their effects on producer inflation. Second, there is no contemporaneous feedback in the model: for example, consumer inflation shocks affect inflation at the import and producer stages only through their effect on expected inflation in future periods.

Under these assumptions, the inflation rates of country i in period t at each of the three stages—import, producer (PPI), and consumer (CPI)—can be written as:⁴

$$\pi_{it}^m = E_{t-1}(\pi_{it}^m) + \alpha_{1i}\varepsilon_{it}^s + \alpha_{2i}\varepsilon_{it}^d + \alpha_{3i}\varepsilon_{it}^e + \varepsilon_{it}^m \quad (1)$$

$$\pi_{it}^w = E_{t-1}(\pi_{it}^w) + \beta_{1i}\varepsilon_{it}^s + \beta_{2i}\varepsilon_{it}^d + \beta_{3i}\varepsilon_{it}^e + \beta_{4i}\varepsilon_{it}^m + \varepsilon_{it}^w \quad (2)$$

$$\pi_{it}^c = E_{t-1}(\pi_{it}^c) + \gamma_{1i}\varepsilon_{it}^s + \gamma_{2i}\varepsilon_{it}^d + \gamma_{3i}\varepsilon_{it}^e + \gamma_{4i}\varepsilon_{it}^m + \gamma_{5i}\varepsilon_{it}^w + \varepsilon_{it}^c \quad (3)$$

where π_{it}^m , π_{it}^w , and π_{it}^c are import price, PPI, and CPI inflation respectively; ε_{it}^s , ε_{it}^d , and ε_{it}^e are the supply, demand, and exchange rate shocks respectively; ε_{it}^m , ε_{it}^w , and ε_{it}^c are the import, producer, and consumer inflation shocks respectively.

⁴Note that even though the data in this study have both cross-sectional and time-series aspects, the model will be estimated for each country separately. This is done for two reasons. First, differing institutions in each country are likely to lead to differences in the responses in each country (hence the i subscript for each coefficient in the equations). Second, even though there is likely to be cross-country correlation in the equations of the model, it would be unwieldy to take this into account to increase the efficiency of the estimates.

ε_{it}^c are the import price, PPI, and CPI inflation shocks; and $E_{t-1}(\cdot)$ is the expectation of a variable based on the information set at the end of period $t - 1$. The shocks are assumed to be serially uncorrelated as well as uncorrelated with one another within a period.

The structure of the model (1)-(3) suggests it is part of a recursive VAR framework. Thus, to complete the empirical model, I make the following assumptions. (1) “Supply” shocks are identified from the dynamics of oil price inflation denominated in the local currency. (2) “Demand” shocks are identified from the dynamics of the output gap in the country after taking into account the contemporaneous effect of the supply shock. (3) “External” shocks are identified from the dynamics of exchange rate appreciation after taking into account the contemporaneous effects of the supply and demand shocks.

$$\pi_{it}^{oil} = E_{t-1}(\pi_{it}^{oil}) + \varepsilon_{it}^s \quad (4)$$

$$\tilde{y}_{it} = E_{t-1}(\tilde{y}_{it}) + a_{1i}\varepsilon_{it}^s + \varepsilon_{it}^d \quad (5)$$

$$\Delta e_{it} = E_{t-1}(\Delta e_{it}) + b_{1i}\varepsilon_{it}^s + b_{2i}\varepsilon_{it}^d + \varepsilon_{it}^e \quad (6)$$

Finally, I assume that the conditional expectations in equations (1)-(6) can be replaced by linear projections of the lags of the six variables in the system.

Under these assumptions, the model can be estimated as a VAR using a Cholesky decomposition.⁵ The impulse responses of PPI and CPI inflation to the orthogonalized shocks of exchange rate appreciation and import price inflation then provide estimates of the effect of these variables on domestic inflation. In addition, variance decompositions of PPI and CPI inflation enable one to determine the importance of these “external” variables for domestic inflation.

4 Data

Data from nine developed countries—the United States, Japan, Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Belgium, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Switzerland—are used in this study.⁶ The data are quarterly and limited to the floating exchange rate period, and come from national sources as compiled by the BIS data bank.⁷ To account

⁵ Although the Cholesky decomposition would identify aggregate supply and demand shocks under the assumptions of this model, one certainly could argue that oil price inflation is affected contemporaneously by both aggregate supply and aggregate demand shocks. If so, each of the shocks in the first two equations of the VAR then would be a combination of aggregate supply and demand shocks (Blanchard and Quah (1989)). However, I believe that this will have little effect on the measurement of exchange rate and import prices shocks and their effect on domestic inflation.

⁶ The German analysis uses all-German data where possible; using only West German data has little effect on the results.

⁷ Although a monthly frequency would be desirable in examining these issues and many of the variables are available monthly, key variables in some countries are available only quarterly. For example, a lengthy import price series for the United States is available only quarterly.

for lags in the construction of some variables and in the model specifications, the estimation period runs from 1976:1 through 1998:4 for most countries.⁸

As far as the variables used in this study, the exchange rate is the quarterly average of the nominal effective exchange rate as computed by the BIS. Depending upon data availability, import prices are either a general import price index or an index of import unit values. The PPI is the most general producer or wholesale price index that excludes imports. Imports were excluded because the broadest available PPI in some countries—in particular, the United States—do not include imports.⁹ The CPI is the overall consumer price index to provide the broadest measure of inflation at the consumer level. The output gap is created by taking the deviations of the log of real GDP from a linear and quadratic trend. The appendix provides country-specific details about the variables.

Annualized percentage changes of the price indices and the average output gaps over five-year periods as well as the last three years are presented in Table 1. This summary provides some insight into the questions and problems of measuring the pass-through of exchange rates and import prices to domestic prices. In particular, the table show that declines in domestic inflation usually have been associated with exchange rate appreciation and import price disinflation/deflation (and *vice versa*), and suggests that these external factors may have played a role in the disinflation of the 1980s and 1990s.

However, it also is apparent that these relationships are not particularly tight. Countries have experienced sizable swings in exchange rates and import prices with little or no effect on domestic prices. For example, the exchange rate has depreciated over the past three years in Japan, Germany, and France, but the depreciations were associated with only a moderate increase in inflation (Japan) or continued disinflation (Germany, France). Other factors obviously have been important in the disinflation experienced by these countries, the most prominent probably being the decline in oil prices. Therefore, econometric analysis using the model presented in Section 3 is required to determine the role of exchange rates and import prices in domestic inflation.

5 Results

As discussed in Section 3, the distribution chain model, equations (1)-(3), can be estimated within a VAR system consisting of six variables: oil price inflation, the

⁸Because of data availability, the estimation period is 1976:1-1998:3 for France and the United Kingdom, 1981:2-1998:4 for Belgium, and 1978:1-1998:4 for the Netherlands.

⁹Using the general PPI irrespective of whether imports were included in the index had little substantive effect on the results outside of the correlation between import share and the pass-through to the PPI.

output gap, exchange rate change, import price inflation, PPI inflation, and CPI inflation.¹⁰ Under the assumptions of the model, the reduced form residuals from the VAR are orthogonalized using a Cholesky decomposition to identify the “structural” shocks, where the variables are in the order given above.

For each country in the sample, the number of lags in the VAR is set at four (a constant is the only other variable included in the regressions), and the model is estimated over the period 1976:1-1998:4 (92 quarters). Two sets of statistics are used to assess the pass-through from exchange rate fluctuations and import price inflation to domestic inflation. First, impulse responses to the exchange rate and import price shocks for each country are estimated over a two-year (8 quarter) horizon.¹¹ These are standardized to correspond to the response to a one percent shock in the exchange rate or import price index to allow a comparison of the sensitivity to these external factors across countries. Second, variance decompositions are used to assess how much of the (forecast) variance in domestic price indices over this period can be attributed to these external factors.

5.1 Responses to exchange rate shocks

Figures 1-3 display the responses of the import price index, the PPI, and the CPI to a shock in the exchange rate in each of the countries of the sample. In this model, the exchange rate shock is estimated given past values of all the variables plus the current values of oil prices and the output gap. The solid line in each graph is the estimated response while the dashed lines denote a two standard error confidence band around the estimate.¹²

Beginning with the most-studied pass-through, the initial impact of an exchange rate appreciation on import prices is negative as expected and remains so for at least a year in all of the countries (Figure 1). By the end of two years, the response is imprecisely estimated in most countries, and there are cases where it is positive. For the US, the estimated pass-through appears to be similar to previous estimates as well as common perceptions concerning exchange rate pass-through.¹³ As far as the other countries, the pass-through appears to be particularly large in Belgium and the Netherlands, with the eventual change in import prices exceeding 1 percent. On

¹⁰By estimating the model in this way, I am ignoring the possibility of cointegration among the log levels of the variables. Cointegration tests do indicate several possible cointegrating vectors. However, the speed of convergence appears to be quite slow (similar to that toward PPP; see Rogoff (1996) and Higgins and Zakrajšek (1999)). Given the short horizons studied in this paper, using this simpler model should have little effect on the results.

¹¹Although the model is estimated in first differences, it is then transformed into levels so that cumulative price level responses are examined.

¹²The error bands are estimated using the Bayesian Monte Carlo method employed by RATS with 1000 draws.

¹³See Kreinin (1977), Woo (1984), Hooper and Mann (1989), and Goldberg and Knetter (1997).

the other hand, the pass-through appears to be surprisingly small in Sweden and Switzerland.

The response of the PPI is quite weak in most of the countries, and in some cases it has the wrong sign (Figure 2). The exceptions to this pattern are Belgium and possibly the Netherlands. The point estimates for the US appear to be somewhat weaker than those in Feinberg (1989), but the estimates for Germany are similar to those in Feinberg (1986). The response of the CPI to the exchange rate shock is even weaker than that of the PPI with even more responses having the wrong sign (Figure 3). Again, the exceptions to this pattern are Belgium and the Netherlands. The weak estimated pass-through to the CPI in the US is similar to the results in Woo (1984) for the pass-through of exchange rates to the consumption price deflator.

Although the estimates of exchange rate pass-through are imprecise, there are noticeable differences across countries. To assess possible reasons for these differences, I examine the Spearman rank correlation statistic between the impulse responses at various horizons and some factors expected to influence pass-through. From the discussion in Section 2, the particular factors chosen are: (1) mean import share (imports as a percentage of domestic demand) over 1985-1998;¹⁴ (2) exchange rate volatility as proxied by the variance of the residuals from the exchange rate equation of the VAR; (3) GDP (aggregate demand) volatility as proxied by the variance of the residuals from the output gap equation; and (4) “competitiveness” as measured by the average ranking from 1996-99 global competitiveness surveys by the World Economic Forum (1999).

The rank correlations are mostly in accord with the hypotheses discussed in Section 2 (Table 2). Higher import shares, less volatile exchange rates, and less volatile GDP are correlated with a greater import price response, although the relationship is statistically significant only for exchange rate volatility (panel a). Greater competitiveness is associated with a smaller response, and this association is statistically significant. This suggests that importers to countries identified as more competitive adjust profit margins to a greater extent in order to maintain market share. The results for the PPI response are similar to those for import prices, although the correlations for import share and exchange rate volatility are stronger (panel b). Finally, the associations between these factors and the response of the CPI are weaker than those for the PPI, the import share and exchange rate volatility have statistically significant correlations only at short horizons (panel c).

To summarize, the impulse responses indicate significant but not complete pass-through of exchange rate fluctuations to import prices in most countries in the sample. However, the pass-through to the PPI and CPI is quite modest for the most part. Therefore, “beachhead” behavior that has been a focus of many studies of import prices in the US appears to be pervasive when examining PPI and CPI pass-through

¹⁴This is the longest period where there are complete data for each of the countries. Using a particular date or subperiod over this interval does not affect the ranking.

in many industrialized economies.¹⁵ Higher import shares, less volatile exchange rates, less volatile GDP, and lesser “competitiveness” are associated with larger pass-through of exchange rates to domestic inflation, although such relationships are short-lived for the CPI.

5.2 Responses to import price shocks

Figures 4 and 5 display the responses of the PPI and the CPI to a shock in import prices. In this model, the import price shock is estimated given past values of all the variables plus the current value of oil prices, the output gap, and the exchange rate. Therefore, the import price shocks are unrelated to exchange rate movements, but are likely to be related to movements in world commodity prices, changes in importers’ profit margins, etc. These responses then should be informative about the pass-through from a general import price decline such as that induced by the Asian crisis.

The response of the PPI to import price shocks is positive as expected and statistically significant for the most part (Figure 4). The responses are particularly large in Belgium and Sweden, with the pass-through eventually exceeding 100 percent. In contrast, the pass-through is rather small in Japan and the Netherlands.

The response of consumer prices to import price shocks is also positive and statistically significant for the most part, although smaller than the PPI response (Figure 5). The pass-through is clearly the largest in Sweden, and is also quite large in the US and the UK. As was the case for the PPI, the pass-through is small in Japan and the Netherlands.

I next examine the cross-country rank correlations between these responses and the four factors listed in the previous subsection (Table 3). For the PPI responses, a higher import share is associated with a larger response while greater exchange rate volatility is correlated with a smaller pass-through, although these relationships are strong at shorter horizons only (panel a). Greater GDP volatility is associated with a stronger pass-through, contrary to the hypothesis stated in Section 2, but the relationship is not statistically significant. Finally, greater competitiveness is associated with a smaller response, a relationship that is statistically significant, suggesting that profit margins at the producer goods level are adjusted more in those countries identified as more “competitive.”

For the CPI responses, many of the correlations between the responses and these factors are contrary to the hypotheses posited in Section 2 (panel b). Import share is negatively correlated with these responses, although not significantly so. Both exchange rate and GDP volatility are positively related to this pass-through, but the relationship is strong only at shorter horizons. Finally, greater competitiveness is as-

¹⁵For examples, see Baldwin (1988) and Baldwin and Krugman (1989).

sociated with a larger initial response, but there is little relationship thereafter. These weak correlations suggest that the pass-through of import prices to consumer prices vary across countries in a more idiosyncratic manner than do other pass-throughs, possibly reflecting country-specific market structures not captured by the variables considered in this study.

Overall, the results in this section indicate a somewhat stronger pass-through from import price shocks (not related to exchange rate shocks) to domestic PPIs and CPIs, although the pass-through is far from complete. Also, the pass-through to consumer prices across countries is more idiosyncratic than the other pass-throughs studied, implying that other less-easily measured factors are behind these differences.

5.3 Variance decomposition

Although the impulse responses provide information about the size of the pass-through of exchange rate and import price shocks to domestic producer and consumer prices, they do not indicate how important these shocks have been in domestic price fluctuations over the sample period. To provide some information on this, I examine the variance decompositions of the price variables.

I begin by examining the importance of exchange rate pass-through for import price fluctuations (Table 4).¹⁶ Exchange rate shocks are especially important in explaining import price variance for the UK, where their share ranges from over 30 to 45 percent. In the other countries, exchange rates explain from 10 to 25 percent of import price forecast variance initially. This percentage declines in all countries as the forecast horizon increases so that it ranges from 2 to 15 percent (with the exception of the UK) at the two year horizon.

The lower part of Table 4 displays the rank correlations between the percentage of import price variance attributed to exchange rate shocks and the factors listed in Section 5.1. Mean import share is negatively associated with this percentage, although the relationship is strong only at shorter horizons. Exchange rate volatility is positively associated with this percentage at shorter horizons, suggesting the effect of greater exchange rate fluctuations counteracts the smaller import price response documented in Section 5.1. However, there is no apparent relationship at longer horizons. GDP volatility is not correlated with this percentage, while there is a weak indication that exchange rates explain less import price variance in more competitive countries.

For producer prices, the percentage of variance explained by external factors—exchange rates and import prices—is quite large in many countries, which may be surprising since the PPI used here excludes imported goods (Table 5). These factors explain one-third or more of variance of PPI (at least for some horizons) in five

¹⁶The complete variance decomposition of import prices as well as the PPI and the CPI can be found in the Appendix in Tables A1-A3.

countries—Germany, France, Belgium, Sweden, and Switzerland. Their contribution in the other countries is more modest. The differences across countries appear to be positively related with GDP volatility at shorter horizons and negatively related with the competitiveness measure at longer horizons.

The influence of external factors on CPI variance is less than it is for the PPI, even though imported goods are included in the CPI (Table 6). In most of the countries, these factors explain less than 20 percent of the variance of the CPI, although this percentage tends to increase as the forecast horizon increases. At shorter horizons, none of the factors I have considered have a strong relationship with the percentage of CPI variance attributed to external factors. However, at longer horizons this percentage tends to be higher for countries with a larger import share, lower exchange rate volatility, and a lower competitiveness ranking.

In summary, the variance decompositions indicate that external factors explain only a modest proportion of the forecast variance of domestic consumer prices over the post-Bretton Woods era. As expected, the influence of these factors appears to be somewhat greater in the more open economies, although the relationship is strong only at longer horizons. Again at longer horizons, the influence of external factors is less in countries with less volatile exchange rates as well as those countries identified as more “competitive.” In regards to the latter correlation, it appears that importers are willing (or feel compelled) to adjust profit margins to maintain market share in those countries whose business climate is consider competitive.

6 Recent Influence of External Factors

The analysis in the previous section suggests that external factors have had only a modest effect on domestic price fluctuations during the post-Bretton Woods era. Nonetheless, these factors still could have been a significant contributor to the recent disinflation in the US and UK (as well as domestic price fluctuations in the other countries) if the shocks to these factors have been large and/or persistent.

To investigate the recent influence of external factors, I use a historical decomposition of the VAR model for the period 1996:1-1998:4.¹⁷ In this decomposition, a base projection is made using the actual data through 1995:4 and assuming no subsequent shocks occur in any of the variables of the model. Then using the estimated shocks to each of the variables, the projection error can be decomposed into the contributions from the shocks to each variable.

I begin with the decomposition of import price inflation to investigate how unusual recent import price behavior has been in these countries. The results are presented in Table 7. The first column of the table displays the actual annualized percentage

¹⁷Because of data availability, the historical decompositions for France and the UK are from 1996:1-1998:3.

change of import prices over 1995:4–1998:4. The second column has the base projection, and the third has the projection error (projection – actual). The last three columns displays the contributions of the shocks combined into three groups: demand and supply shocks (oil price and output gap), external factors (exchange rate and import price shocks), and domestic price shocks (PPI and CPI). The contribution is defined as the difference between the base projection and the projection which includes the associated shocks.¹⁸

According to the model, import price inflation was below its projection in just over one-half of the countries in the sample—the US, Germany, the UK, Sweden, and Switzerland. Shocks to external factors contributed to the lower import price inflation in these countries as well as France and Belgium. In those countries outside of the US and the UK, the disinflationary effects of negative shocks to import prices stemming from the Asian crisis overwhelmed the inflationary effects of exchange rate depreciation. As far as the other variables, supply and demand shocks contributed to higher import price inflation in all countries except the US. In contrast, domestic price shocks lowered import price inflation except in Germany.

Moving to domestic price behavior, actual PPI inflation was less than projected except in Japan and the Netherlands (Table 8). Shocks to the external factors reduced PPI inflation in this period in all countries except the Netherlands. Therefore, these factors contributed to lower PPI inflation not only in the US and the UK (whose currencies appreciated), but also in depreciating currency countries like Germany and Japan. As was the case for import price inflation, supply and demand shocks in this period tended to increase PPI inflation except in the US. Finally, price shocks reduced PPI inflation in all of the countries, suggesting that the recent disinflation has been influenced by factors outside of the model, which may include a greater policy emphasis on reducing inflation.

The story for consumer price inflation is similar to that of producer price inflation (Table 9). Except for Japan and the Netherlands, actual CPI inflation was below the model’s base projection. Shocks to the external factors were negative contributors except for Belgium and the Netherlands. So these factors reduced inflation not only in countries where the currency had appreciated, but also in a number of countries where the currency had depreciated. Except for the US and Sweden, supply and demand shocks contributed to higher consumer price inflation during this period. Domestic price shocks reduced CPI inflation in all countries during this period, suggesting that some factors outside of the model have contributed to the disinflation. In particular, this may reflect a greater policy emphasis on reducing inflation during this period.¹⁹

¹⁸Because the table displays the more familiar annualized percentage changes rather than the log differences in which the model was estimated, the contributions do not add up exactly to the projection error.

¹⁹In the case of the US, another factor that may have contributed to negative CPI shocks was the implementation of methodological changes in the CPI during this period. It would be desirable

Overall, the historical decompositions of the last three years suggest that exchange rates and import prices have been a larger factor in the disinflation of the period than would be suggested from their modest contributions to inflation over the post-Bretton Woods era. A major reason for the larger contribution during this period probably is the global overcapacity in many goods induced by the Asian crisis, which contributed to a decline in the world price of many goods imported by the industrialized economies. Nevertheless, it appears that tighter monetary policy in these countries during this period also contributed to the disinflation.

7 Has the Influence of External Factors Changed?

When discussing the influence of exchange rates and import prices on domestic inflation, pundits frequently point to greater global integration and competition as reasons for a greater pass-through of these factors. On the other hand, central banks have been more concerned with price stability during the last two decades. This would imply that monetary authorities may have counteracted the inflationary impact of these external shocks, reducing the measured pass-through over time.²⁰

Therefore, the pass-through of external factors to domestic inflation may have changed over the period of estimation. To investigate this, I use a simple strategy of estimating the model over a shorter sample period that does not include the 1970s.²¹ Balancing the concerns of using data from as late in the sample period as possible and of having sufficient observations for estimation, I decided to estimate the model from 1983:1 to 1998:4. I then examine some of the statistics discussed previously, concentrating solely on the CPI for brevity.²²

First examining the impulse response of the CPI to an import price shock, the differences between the responses estimated over the whole sample and those estimated over the shorter sample are small and probably statistically insignificant (Figure 6). Nevertheless, an import price shock appears to have a less inflationary effect during the later sample period in the US, Japan, France, the UK, and Sweden. Therefore, the impulse response functions do not indicate a greater pass-through from import prices to consumer prices during the 1980s and 1990s. In addition, the cross-country

to use a methodologically consistent series, but the historical data has not yet been updated to the new methodology. So for now, I use the published historical series.

²⁰Some small open economies, most prominently Canada and New Zealand, began to use a monetary conditions index as a guide to monetary policy during this period. Such indices include the country's exchange rate as a component. The countries in my sample did not formally incorporate such an index in their monetary policy deliberations, but they certainly may have informally incorporated exchange rates and import prices into their policy calculations.

²¹Alternatively, one may wish to estimate a time-varying parameter model to address this issue. However, incorporating such variation in an identified VAR is a difficult exercise (see, for example, Boivin (1998)) and is beyond the scope of this paper.

²²The conclusions in examining the effects on the PPI are substantially the same.

rank correlations between the responses and the factors listed in Section 5.1 retain the same signs, although they are somewhat weaker than they are in the full sample.

From the variance decomposition of the CPI in the later sample, external factors continue to contribute modestly to CPI fluctuations (Table 10). The proportion of the CPI forecast variance explained by these factors in the shorter sample period is similar to that in the full sample for most of the countries (upper panel). Thus, by this metric, the external factors do not appear to have become more important in explaining CPI fluctuations. In addition, the relationship between the external factor contribution and the various factors listed in Section 5.1 across countries is similar in the two samples (lower panel).

Concentrating on the last three years' disinflation, the historical decomposition suggests a smaller contribution of external factors to the disinflation (Table 11). Except for the UK, external factors have a lesser disinflationary effect in the model estimated over the later period than in the model estimated over the full sample. The disinflationary contributions in most countries except the UK come from the price shocks, suggesting again that there have been influences outside of the model that have contributed to the disinflation. Among such influences may be a greater policy emphasis on reducing inflation, a factor particularly relevant in the European economies during the runup to the introduction of the euro.

Overall, these results suggest that the exchange rate and import prices have not assumed a bigger role in domestic consumer price inflation in recent years. There is even some suggestion that they may have had a smaller role. In any case, the conclusion that the pass-through is modest still appears to hold in this later period.

8 Conclusion

This paper has examined the pass-through of external factors—the exchange rate and import prices—to domestic inflation for several industrialized economies. Using a VAR model of a distribution chain, my results potentially can reconcile some of the recent findings concerning the effect of globalization on the US inflation process. First, the impulse responses and variance decompositions estimated over the post-Bretton Woods period show that the effect of external factors on domestic inflation is quite modest in most of these countries, including the US. This would suggest that when looking over this whole period, external variables like global capacity have had little effect on domestic inflation, consistent with Tootell's (1998) results for the US.

However, when I examine the recent disinflation episode, I find that external factors have a sizable disinflationary effect in all of the countries, in particular the US and the UK. Although the pass-through is generally modest, the shocks to these factors during 1996-98 were sufficiently large and/or frequent to have a significant disinflationary effect. Therefore, concentrating on the mid- to late-1990s, as do Boldin

(1998) and Koenig (1998), external factors appear to improve the forecast of US consumer price inflation.

These results also have several implications for monetary policy in the industrialized countries. One is that although external factors have contributed to the disinflation of the 1990s, their contribution mostly has been modest. Thus much of the decline in inflation during this decade has come from other, presumably more permanent factors, indicating that central banks have been successful in reducing inflation trends and expectations. Another implication is that recent fluctuations in exchange rates and import prices resulting from the recent economic turmoil and the nascent recovery from it probably will have modest effects on domestic PPI and CPI inflation in the industrialized world unless domestic policy mistakes are made.

Nevertheless, because of the recent financial and economic crises in several emerging markets and their effects on the global prices of some goods as well as increasing globalization, more research on the extent to which pass-through may have changed in recent years is necessary. A model that incorporates time variation in some of its parameters may be desirable for such an investigation. Furthermore, additional investigation into the sources of the 1990s disinflation is needed; in particular, the role and sources of the domestic “price shocks” in the historical decomposition. Such an investigation also may provide more insight into the mechanisms behind the pass-through of exchange rates and import prices to domestic prices.

A Data Appendix

This appendix describes some of the details in the construction of the variables used in this study. As mentioned in the text, the data come from the BIS data bank. I first variables whose construction is common for all the countries. I then discuss the construction of GDP, the import price index, the PPI, and the CPI for each country separately, as the details in their construction differs across countries.

A.1 Common variable construction

Local currency oil price index: This is constructed for each country using a crude oil US dollar-basis price index from the BIS data bank (1990=100, quarterly average of monthly data). This is converted into a local currency index using an index of the currency's exchange rate versus the US dollar (1990=1.00, quarterly average of monthly data).

Output gap: As discussed in the text of the paper, the output gap is calculated as the residual from a regression of the logarithm of GDP (details for each country are given below) on a constant plus linear and quadratic time trends.

Exchange rate: This is taken as the quarterly average of the BIS-calculated nominal effective exchange rate index versus 25 countries (1990=100).

Import share: This is imports as a percentage of domestic demand (GDP + imports - exports), where all variables are in the same units as GDP (see below for each country).

Competitiveness: This is the average ranking of global competitiveness from 1996-99 as compiled by the World Economic Forum (1999).

A.2 Nation-specific variable construction

A.2.1 United States

GDP: This is gross domestic product valued using billions of 1992 chained-weighted US dollars, seasonally adjusted at an annual rate.

Import price index: This is the national income and product account (NIPA) total import price index (1992 = 100), seasonally adjusted.

PPI: This is the quarterly average of the monthly finished goods index of the US PPI (1982=100), seasonally adjusted.

CPI: This is the quarterly average of the monthly all items index of the US CPI (all urban consumers, 1982-84=100), seasonally adjusted.

A.2.2 Japan

GDP: This is gross domestic product in billions of yen valued using 1990 prices, seasonally adjusted at an annual rate.

Import price index: This is the quarterly average of the monthly general index of import prices in Japan (1995=100), not seasonally adjusted. The series is seasonally adjusted by regressing the log difference of the series on quarterly dummy variables.

PPI: This is the quarterly average of the monthly general wholesale price index for domestic products for domestic use (1995=100), not seasonally adjusted. The series is seasonally adjusted in the same manner as the import price series.

CPI: This is the quarterly average of the monthly all-Japan general CPI (1995=100), not seasonally adjusted. The series is seasonally adjusted in the same manner as the import price series.

A.2.3 Germany

GDP: This is constructed by splicing two series. The first is the all-German gross domestic product in billions of marks using 1991 prices, seasonally adjusted, which begins in 1991:1. Prior to that, I use West German gross domestic product in billions of marks at 1991 prices, seasonally adjusted. This latter series is reindexed so that the 1991:1 value of the two series are equal.

Import price index: This is the quarterly average of the monthly general import price index (1991=100), seasonally adjusted, which is available for the combined West and East over the whole sample period.

PPI: This is constructed by splicing two series. The first is the all-German PPI excluding the VAT for manufactures domestic sales (1991=100), not seasonally adjusted, which begins in 1991:1. Prior to that, I use the West German version of the same series. The latter series is reindexed so that the 1991:1 value of the two series are equal. The spliced series is seasonally adjusted by regressing the log difference of the series on quarterly dummy variables.

CPI: This is constructed in the same manner as the PPI. The two series that are spliced are the all-German all items cost of living index (1991=100), seasonally adjusted which begins in 1991:1; and the West German version of the same.

A.2.4 France

GDP: This is gross domestic product in millions of French francs valued using 1980 prices, seasonally adjusted.

Import price index: This is the implicit price deflator for import of goods and services in the GDP accounts (1980=100), seasonally adjusted.

PPI: This is the quarterly producer price index for industrial products (1980=100), seasonally adjusted.

CPI: This is constructed by splicing two series. The first is the quarterly average of the monthly retail consumer prices index, all items (1990=100), not seasonally adjusted, which begins in 1990:1. Prior to that, I use the retail prices index, total (1980=100), not seasonally adjusted. The latter series is reindexed so that the 1990:1 of the two series are equal. The spliced series is seasonally adjusted by regressing the log difference of the series on quarterly dummy variables.

A.2.5 United Kingdom

GDP: This is gross domestic product (expenditure-based) in millions of British pounds using 1990 prices, seasonally adjusted.

Import price index: This is the quarterly general index of import prices (1990=100), not seasonally adjusted. It is seasonally adjusted by regressing the log difference of the series on quarterly dummy variables.

PPI: This is the quarterly average of the monthly producer price index of home market sales of all manufactured products based on the 1992 SIC classification (1990=100), not seasonally adjusted. It is seasonally adjusted in the same manner as the import price index.

CPI: This is the quarterly average of the monthly retail price index, all items (January 1987 = 100), not seasonally adjusted. It is seasonally adjusted in the same manner as the import price index.

A.2.6 Belgium

GDP: This is constructed by splicing two series. The first is gross domestic product in billions of Belgian francs using 1990 prices, seasonally adjusted, which begins in 1984:1. For 1980:1–1983:4, I use a discontinued gross domestic product series in billions of Belgian francs using 1985 prices, seasonally adjusted. The latter series is reindexed so that the 1984:1 value of the two series are equal.

Import price index: This is the quarterly average of the monthly imported goods producer price index (1990=100), not seasonally adjusted. It is available beginning in 1980, which matches the period GDP is available. The series is seasonally adjusted by regressing the log difference of the series on quarterly dummy variables.

PPI: This is constructed by splicing two series. The first is the quarterly average of the monthly index of producer prices for domestic sales of finished manufactures (1990=100), not seasonally adjusted, which begins in 1980:1. Prior to that, I use a discontinued quarterly average of the monthly index of producer prices for finished manufactures (1980=100), not seasonally adjusted. The latter series is reindexed so that the 1980:1 value of the two series are equal. The spliced series is seasonally adjusted in the same manner as the import price index series.

CPI: This is constructed by splicing three series. The first is the quarterly average of the monthly general consumer price index (1996=100), seasonally adjusted, which

begins in 1991:1. The second is the quarterly average of a discontinued monthly general consumer price index (1980=100), seasonally adjusted, which begins in 1980:1. The second series is reindexed to the 1991:1 value of the first series. The third series is the quarterly average of another discontinued monthly general consumer price index (1980=100), seasonally adjusted, which begins in 1970:1. The third series is reindexed to the 1980:1 value of the reindexed second series.

A.2.7 Netherlands

GDP: This is gross domestic product in millions of Dutch guilders using 1990 prices at purchasers' values, seasonally adjusted.

Import price index: This is constructed by splicing two series. The first is the quarterly average of the monthly general import price index (1990=100), not seasonally adjusted, which begins in 1981:1. Prior to that, I use the unit value of total imports (1990=100), not seasonally adjusted. The latter series is reindexed so that the 1981:1 values of the two series are equal. The spliced series is seasonally adjusted by regressing the log difference of the series on quarterly dummy variables.

PPI: This is the quarterly average of the monthly producer price index excluding exports and imports (1990=100), not seasonally adjusted. The series is seasonally adjusted in the same manner as the import price series.

CPI: This is the quarterly average of the monthly all items consumer price index for all households (1995=100), seasonally adjusted.

A.2.8 Sweden

GDP: This is constructed by splicing two series. The first is gross domestic product in millions of Swedish kroner using 1991 prices, not seasonally adjusted, which begins in 1980:1. Prior to that, I use a discontinued gross domestic product series in millions of Swedish kroner using 1980 prices, not seasonally adjusted. The latter series is reindexed so that the 1980:1 value of the two series are equal to the 1980:1 value of the 1991-price series. The resulting series is seasonally adjusted using the US Census X-11 program.²³

Import price index: This is constructed by splicing two series. The first is the quarterly average of the monthly general import price index (1990=100), not seasonally adjusted, which begins in 1990:1. Prior to that, I use the quarterly average of a discontinued monthly index of import prices (ISIC 1-3, 1968=100), not seasonally adjusted. The latter series is reindexed so that the 1990:1 values of the two series are equal. The spliced series is seasonally adjusted by regressing the log difference of the series on quarterly dummy variables.

²³Seasonally adjusting by regressing the log difference of the not seasonally adjusted series on quarterly dummy variables had no substantive effect on the results.

PPI: This is constructed by splicing two series. The first is the quarterly average of the monthly producer price index for home sales (1990=100), not seasonally adjusted, which begins in 1990:1. Prior to that, I use the quarterly average of the monthly general domestic supply price index (1968=100), not seasonally adjusted. The latter series is reindexed so that the 1990:1 values of the two series are equal. The spliced series is seasonally adjusted in the same manner as the import price series.

CPI: This is the quarterly average of the monthly all items consumer price index (1980=100), not seasonally adjusted. The series is seasonally adjusted in the same manner as the import price series.

A.2.9 Switzerland

GDP: The construction of this series is similar to that of the Swedish GDP series. The primary series is gross domestic product in millions of Swiss francs using 1990 prices, not seasonally adjusted, which begins in 1980:1. Prior to that, I use a discontinued gross domestic product series in millions of Swiss francs using 1980 prices, not seasonally adjusted. The series are spliced in the same manner as the Swedish GDP series were spliced, and the resulting series is seasonally adjusted using the US Census X-11 program.²⁴

Import price index: This is the quarterly average of the monthly general import price index (May 1993=100), not seasonally adjusted. The series is seasonally adjusted by regressing the log difference of the series on quarterly dummy variables.

PPI: This is the quarterly average of the monthly producer price index excluding imports (May 1993=100), not seasonally adjusted. The series is seasonally adjusted in the same manner as the import price series.

CPI: This is the quarterly average of the monthly all items consumer price index (May 1993=100), not seasonally adjusted. The series is seasonally adjusted in the same manner as the import price series.

²⁴Again, seasonally adjusting by regressing the log difference of the series on quarterly dummy variables had little impact on the results.


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Figure 1


Response of import prices to 1% increase in exchange rates



Quarters after shock

Figure 2


Response of PPI to 1% increase in exchange rates



Quarters after shock


Figure 3

Response of CPI to 1% increase in exchange rates



Quarters after shock


Figure 4
Response of PPI to 1% increase in import prices



Quarters after shock

Figure 5


Response of CPI to 1% increase in import prices



Quarters after shock

Figure 6

Response of CPI to 1% increase in import prices



_____ 1976:1-1998:4 - - - - 1983:1-1998:4

Table 1
Summary statistics for various periods
Annualized percentage changes over the periods

Country	Oil prices	Output gap ^a	Exchange rate	Import prices	PPI	CPI
<i>United States</i>						
1976 - 80	26.3	1.5	-1.4	13.1	9.3	9.5
1981 - 85	-15.4	-1.7	3.4	-2.1	2.1	4.5
1986 - 90	2.4	2.0	-5.8	3.2	3.2	4.2
1991 - 95	-1.3	-1.7	0.0	-0.4	1.3	2.8
1996 - 98	-13.0	0.6	4.7	-3.9	0.3	2.1
<i>Japan</i>						
1976 - 80	16.9	0.3	8.1	7.2	5.2	6.1
1981 - 85	-16.9	-2.2	5.5	-4.4	-0.6	2.3
1986 - 90	-4.3	0.5	2.9	-4.7	-0.3	1.6
1991 - 95	-5.9	1.6	5.4	-4.2	-1.2	0.9
1996 - 98	-9.0	-0.8	-1.0	-0.8	-0.9	1.1
<i>Germany</i>						
1976 - 80	21.2	1.9	3.7	6.9	4.1	4.2
1981 - 85	-13.4	-1.9	3.1	0.7	2.5	3.2
1986 - 90	-6.0	-1.1	2.5	-1.8	1.2	1.7
1991 - 95	-2.1	2.6	1.7	-0.5	1.1	3.4
1996 - 98	-9.1	-1.5	-1.4	-0.7	0.0	1.3
<i>France</i>						
1976 - 80	28.1	0.9	-2.5	13.7	10.9	10.9
1981 - 85	-8.4	-1.0	-2.9	5.9	7.8	8.4
1986 - 90	-4.0	0.5	0.0	0.4	1.7	3.2
1991 - 95	-2.0	-0.1	1.7	-0.1	0.3	2.2
1996 - 98	-9.7	-0.1	-0.6	-0.7 ^c	0.2 ^c	0.9
<i>United Kingdom</i>						
1976 - 80	22.7	0.9	1.9	9.7	13.6	13.4
1981 - 85	-7.0	-3.4	-5.1	6.6	6.5	6.3
1986 - 90	-3.2	3.7	-0.4	1.5	4.4	6.3
1991 - 95	3.1	-1.3	-4.2	4.7	3.5	2.9
1996 - 98	-15.9	-0.3	7.3	-5.4 ^c	0.7	3.1
<i>Belgium</i>						
1976 - 80	22.6	3.4 ^b	1.6	14.3 ^b	4.4	8.0
1981 - 85	-9.2	-1.2	-2.1	6.0	4.9	6.3
1986 - 90	-5.8	0.3	1.7	-1.0	-0.1	2.2
1991 - 95	-2.2	0.6	1.4	0.4	0.7	2.3
1996 - 98	-8.9	-0.7	-1.4	0.5	-0.7	1.3
<i>Netherlands</i>						
1976 - 80	22.3	1.2 ^d	1.6	8.2	4.0	5.7
1981 - 85	-12.8	-1.8	2.1	-0.8	2.5	3.4
1986 - 90	-5.9	0.6	1.9	-2.4	-1.1	1.0
1991 - 95	-2.4	0.7	1.5	-0.3	0.4	2.7
1996 - 98	-8.6	-0.7	-1.6	-1.9	0.1	2.0
<i>Sweden</i>						
1976 - 80	27.3	-0.4	-2.0	12.8	10.8	10.9
1981 - 85	-6.7	-1.6	-5.0	6.7	7.9	7.9
1986 - 90	-2.8	2.9	-0.8	2.3	4.3	7.0
1991 - 95	2.2	-1.6	-2.9	3.7	2.6	2.8
1996 - 98	-7.7	0.2	-2.6	0.2	0.0	0.2
<i>Switzerland</i>						
1976 - 80	18.8	-2.6	4.8	2.8	1.7	2.8
1981 - 85	-14.7	-0.6	3.7	0.3	2.3	3.7
1986 - 90	-5.7	1.7	1.8	-0.7	1.4	3.1
1991 - 95	-3.2	0.6	2.3	-0.9	0.0	2.5
1996 - 98	-8.7	-1.4	-1.5	-1.5	-1.3	0.3

Notes:

^a Average output gap over the period.

^b 1980 only

^c Through 1998:3

^d 1977 - 80

Table 2
Rank correlation between impulse responses to
exchange rates and factors influencing
pass-through

(a) Impulse response of import prices				
Factor	Response horizon			
	0	1	4	8
<i>Import share</i>	0.033	0.267	0.283	0.417
<i>Ex. rate volatility</i>	-0.317	-0.483*	-0.650**	-0.700**
<i>GDP volatility</i>	-0.133	-0.433	-0.433	-0.350
<i>Competitiveness</i>	-0.550*	-0.567*	-0.517*	-0.200

(b) Impulse response of PPI				
<i>Import share</i>	0.783***	0.667**	0.467*	0.483*
<i>Ex. rate volatility</i>	-0.767***	-0.717**	-0.650**	-0.617**
<i>GDP volatility</i>	0.167	0.033	-0.150	-0.050
<i>Competitiveness</i>	-0.717**	-0.750**	-0.667**	-0.350

(c) Impulse response of CPI				
<i>Import share</i>	0.617**	0.567*	0.300	0.267
<i>Ex. rate volatility</i>	-0.533*	-0.450	-0.450	-0.450
<i>GDP volatility</i>	0.333	0.450	0.083	-0.050
<i>Competitiveness</i>	-0.317	-0.433	-0.483*	-0.250

* Significant at the 10 percent level (critical value=0.467)

** Significant at the 5 percent level (critical value = 0.583)

*** Significant at the 1 percent level (critical value = 0.767)

Table 3

Rank correlation between impulse responses to
import prices and factors influencing
pass-through

Factor	Response horizon			
	0	1	4	8
(a) Impulse response of PPI				
<i>Import share</i>	0.267	0.550 [*]	0.233	0.217
<i>Ex. rate volatility</i>	-0.350	-0.583 ^{**}	-0.183	-0.300
<i>GDP volatility</i>	0.183	0.300	0.350	0.167
<i>Competitiveness</i>	-0.467 [*]	-0.600 ^{**}	-0.333	-0.483 [*]
(b) Impulse response of CPI				
<i>Import share</i>	-0.333	-0.400	-0.250	-0.083
<i>Ex. rate volatility</i>	0.567 [*]	0.483 [*]	0.383	0.267
<i>GDP volatility</i>	0.417	0.533 [*]	0.300	0.050
<i>Competitiveness</i>	0.517 [*]	0.083	0.150	0.150

* Significant at the 10 percent level (critical value=0.467)

** Significant at the 5 percent level (critical value = 0.583)

*** Significant at the 1 percent level (critical value = 0.767)

Table 4
 Percentage of import price forecast variance
 attributed to exchange rate shocks

Country	Forecast horizon			
	0	1	4	8
<i>United States</i>	16.3	12.9	9.2	14.5
<i>Japan</i>	24.3	17.4	9.8	4.6
<i>Germany</i>	26.4	21.0	18.5	12.7
<i>France</i>	16.6	18.7	16.2	9.8
<i>United Kingdom</i>	44.5	45.4	38.6	32.4
<i>Belgium</i>	13.4	16.1	15.0	12.6
<i>Netherlands</i>	6.7	8.9	11.7	10.5
<i>Sweden</i>	27.1	15.8	4.3	1.8
<i>Switzerland</i>	10.8	7.7	5.1	2.7

Spearman rank correlation coefficient with:				
<i>Import share</i>	-0.533 [*]	-0.433	-0.100	-0.250
<i>Ex. rate volatility</i>	0.583 ^{**}	0.217	-0.183	0.033
<i>GDP volatility</i>	0.383	-0.067	-0.250	-0.250
<i>Competitiveness</i>	-0.167	-0.450	-0.367	0.117

* Significant at the 10 percent level (critical value=0.467)

** Significant at the 5 percent level (critical value = 0.583)

*** Significant at the 1 percent level (critical value = 0.767)

Table 5

Percentage of PPI forecast variance attributed
to exchange rate and import price shocks

Country	Forecast horizon			
	0	1	4	8
<i>United States</i>	12.3	8.2	13.4	14.6
<i>Japan</i>	21.1	29.9	17.3	13.9
<i>Germany</i>	48.8	44.4	45.7	45.3
<i>France</i>	33.4	29.6	21.2	18.4
<i>United Kingdom</i>	8.8	8.7	16.3	15.8
<i>Belgium</i>	20.9	29.8	46.9	51.8
<i>Netherlands</i>	5.3	10.1	11.4	11.4
<i>Sweden</i>	41.6	39.7	44.6	46.1
<i>Switzerland</i>	33.9	37.9	33.0	26.9

Spearman rank correlation coefficient with:				
<i>Import share</i>	-0.133	0.067	0.283	0.400
<i>Ex. rate volatility</i>	0.000	-0.100	-0.350	-0.367
<i>GDP volatility</i>	0.467*	0.600**	0.200	0.233
<i>Competitiveness</i>	-0.417	-0.517*	-0.733**	-0.600**

* Significant at the 10 percent level (critical value=0.467)

** Significant at the 5 percent level (critical value = 0.583)

*** Significant at the 1 percent level (critical value = 0.767)

Table 6

Percentage of CPI forecast variance attributed
to exchange rate and import price shocks

Country	Forecast horizon			
	0	1	4	8
<i>United States</i>	10.3	8.8	8.9	10.5
<i>Japan</i>	8.2	14.5	15.6	11.1
<i>Germany</i>	7.0	17.6	27.2	25.3
<i>France</i>	13.2	17.9	17.7	16.7
<i>United Kingdom</i>	3.2	5.4	10.8	10.4
<i>Belgium</i>	3.4	7.1	18.8	26.5
<i>Netherlands</i>	12.9	16.7	17.2	15.1
<i>Sweden</i>	10.6	16.6	22.8	27.5
<i>Switzerland</i>	6.2	7.3	13.6	16.9

Spearman rank correlation coefficient with:				
<i>Import share</i>	-0.033	-0.133	0.300	0.533*
<i>Ex. rate volatility</i>	-0.200	-0.300	-0.533*	-0.550*
<i>GDP volatility</i>	-0.200	0.000	0.267	0.317
<i>Competitiveness</i>	-0.033	-0.367	-0.883***	-0.667**

* Significant at the 10 percent level (critical value=0.467)

** Significant at the 5 percent level (critical value = 0.583)

*** Significant at the 1 percent level (critical value = 0.767)

Table 7
Historical decomposition of import prices: 1995:4-1998:4
Annualized percentage changes

Country	Actual	No subsequent shocks:		Contribution of shocks (percentage points): ^a		
		Projection	Projection error	Oil price and output gap	Ex. rate and import price	PPI and CPI
<i>United States</i>	-3.8	0.7	-4.4	-1.2	-2.5	-0.7
<i>Japan</i>	0.2	-3.5	3.7	4.8	1.2	-2.2
<i>Germany</i>	-0.6	0.0	-0.6	1.4	-2.7	0.8
<i>France</i> ^b	0.7	-1.5	2.2	3.5	-0.8	-0.5
<i>United Kingdom</i> ^b	-4.7	1.7	-6.4	0.5	-5.7	-1.3
<i>Belgium</i>	1.2	0.5	0.6	2.5	-0.4	-1.4
<i>Netherlands</i>	-1.0	-2.6	1.6	1.0	0.9	-0.3
<i>Sweden</i>	0.0	3.6	-3.5	0.5	-2.0	-2.0
<i>Switzerland</i>	-1.8	-0.6	-1.2	0.9	-1.9	-0.2

Notes:

^a Because the model is estimated in log differences while import price inflation in this table is expressed as an annualized percentage rate, the contributions of the shocks do not add up exactly to the projection error.

^b Because of data availability, the decomposition is through 1998:3 for France and the United Kingdom.

Table 8
Historical decomposition of PPI: 1995:4-1998:4
Annualized percentage changes

Country	Actual	No subsequent shocks:		Contribution of shocks (percentage points): ^a		
		Projection	Projection error	Oil price and output gap	Ex. rate and import price	PPI and CPI
<i>United States</i>	0.6	2.1	-1.5	-0.5	-0.4	-0.5
<i>Japan</i>	-0.9	-1.1	0.2	1.6	-0.5	-1.0
<i>Germany</i>	-0.1	1.3	-1.3	0.2	-1.2	-0.4
<i>France</i> ^b	-0.8	-0.5	-0.3	1.5	-1.0	-0.8
<i>United Kingdom</i> ^b	1.1	3.5	-2.4	0.7	-1.6	-1.4
<i>Belgium</i>	-0.4	0.4	-0.8	1.5	-0.3	-2.0
<i>Netherlands</i>	0.5	-0.8	1.3	0.8	0.6	-0.2
<i>Sweden</i>	-0.4	3.2	-3.6	0.2	-2.2	-1.5
<i>Switzerland</i>	-1.4	-0.1	-1.3	0.3	-1.1	-0.6

Notes:

^a Because the model is estimated in log differences while import price inflation in this table is expressed as an annualized percentage rate, the contributions of the shocks do not add up exactly to the projection error.

^b Because of data availability, the decomposition is through 1998:3 for France and the United Kingdom.

Table 9
Historical decomposition of CPI: 1995:4-1998:4
Annualized percentage changes

Country	Actual	No subsequent shocks:		Contribution of shocks (percentage points): ^a		
		Projection	Projection error	Oil price and output gap	Ex. rate and import price	PPI and CPI
<i>United States</i>	2.2	3.5	-1.3	-0.3	-0.3	-0.6
<i>Japan</i>	1.1	1.0	0.1	0.9	-0.3	-0.5
<i>Germany</i>	1.3	2.3	-1.0	0.0	-0.5	-0.5
<i>France</i> ^b	1.1	1.4	-0.3	0.8	-1.0	0.0
<i>United Kingdom</i> ^b	3.1	4.2	-1.1	0.6	-0.6	-1.1
<i>Belgium</i>	1.5	2.1	-0.6	0.6	0.0	-1.1
<i>Netherlands</i>	2.2	1.4	0.8	0.1	0.6	0.1
<i>Sweden</i>	0.0	4.3	-4.3	-0.2	-1.7	-2.4
<i>Switzerland</i>	0.3	1.5	-1.1	0.4	-1.1	-0.5

Notes:

^a Because the model is estimated in log differences while import price inflation in this table is expressed as an annualized percentage rate, the contributions of the shocks do not add up exactly to the projection error.

^b Because of data availability, the decomposition is through 1998:3 for France and the United Kingdom.

Table 10

Percentage of CPI forecast variance attributed
to exchange rate and import price shocks

Model estimated over 1983:1 - 1998:1

Country	Forecast horizon			
	0	1	4	8
<i>United States</i>	11.5	4.1	1.8	5.3
<i>Japan</i>	5.3	7.0	3.4	1.7
<i>Germany</i>	3.4	8.2	15.2	11.4
<i>France</i>	1.6	4.9	24.5	32.7
<i>United Kingdom</i>	6.2	9.1	17.3	17.4
<i>Belgium</i>	1.8	4.7	17.9	24.3
<i>Netherlands</i>	7.6	16.5	18.6	15.5
<i>Sweden</i>	26.7	34.4	27.5	20.9
<i>Switzerland</i>	14.2	12.5	14.8	14.0
Spearman rank correlation coefficient with:				
<i>Import share</i>	0.050	0.333	0.600**	0.667**
<i>Ex. rate volatility</i>	0.383	0.033	-0.517*	-0.583**
<i>GDP volatility</i>	-0.067	0.400	0.400	0.050
<i>Competitiveness</i>	0.667**	0.117	-0.517*	-0.483*

* Significant at the 10 percent level (critical value=0.467)

** Significant at the 5 percent level (critical value = 0.583)

*** Significant at the 1 percent level (critical value = 0.767)

Table 11
Historical decomposition of CPI: 1995:4-1998:1
 Model estimated over 1983:1-1998:1
 Annualized percentage changes

Country	Actual	No subsequent shocks:		Contribution of shocks (percentage points): ^a		
		Projection	Projection error	Oil price and output gap	Ex. rate and import price	PPI and CPI
<i>United States</i>	2.2	3.1	-0.9	-0.2	-0.1	-0.6
<i>Japan</i>	1.1	1.5	-0.5	0.0	-0.1	-0.4
<i>Germany</i>	1.3	1.9	-0.6	0.1	0.0	-0.7
<i>France</i> ^b	1.1	1.8	-0.7	0.1	0.1	-0.8
<i>United Kingdom</i> ^b	3.1	3.9	-0.8	-0.6	-0.7	0.5
<i>Belgium</i>	1.5	1.7	-0.3	0.5	0.1	-0.8
<i>Netherlands</i>	2.2	1.8	0.4	0.1	0.2	0.0
<i>Sweden</i>	0.0	2.1	-2.1	-0.2	-1.2	-0.8
<i>Switzerland</i>	0.3	0.8	-0.5	0.5	-0.5	-0.5

Notes:

^a Because the model is estimated in log differences while import price inflation in this table is expressed as an annualized percentage rate, the contributions of the shocks do not add up exactly to the projection error.

^b Because of data availability, the decomposition is through 1998:3 for France and the United Kingdom.

Table A1
Variance decomposition of import prices

Country	Forecast Horizon	Percentage of forecast variance attributed to:					
		oil prices	output gap	exch. rate	import pr.	PPI	CPI
<i>United States</i>	0	40.7	7.1	16.3	35.9	0.0	0.0
	1	55.5	9.5	12.9	21.3	0.3	0.6
	4	54.2	19.6	9.2	13.7	0.2	3.1
	8	41.5	29.4	14.5	9.7	0.7	4.2
<i>Japan</i>	0	46.3	2.1	24.3	27.3	0.0	0.0
	1	70.4	1.0	17.4	10.8	0.1	0.3
	4	81.2	0.4	9.8	4.2	1.9	2.6
	8	78.1	3.7	4.6	5.6	4.9	3.1
<i>Germany</i>	0	42.2	0.0	26.4	31.3	0.0	0.0
	1	49.2	0.8	21.0	28.7	0.1	0.1
	4	50.2	2.8	18.5	26.7	0.7	1.2
	8	49.8	5.3	12.7	29.1	2.1	1.0
<i>France</i>	0	29.0	1.2	16.6	53.2	0.0	0.0
	1	37.7	0.5	18.7	41.8	1.1	0.3
	4	38.1	0.8	16.2	32.8	10.3	1.8
	8	33.9	3.3	9.8	30.9	16.2	6.0
<i>United Kingdom</i>	0	19.9	0.2	44.5	35.3	0.0	0.0
	1	24.6	0.1	45.4	25.4	3.8	0.7
	4	22.8	0.3	38.6	27.2	10.5	0.7
	8	22.3	0.6	32.4	24.8	17.5	2.4
<i>Belgium</i>	0	40.4	0.4	13.4	45.9	0.0	0.0
	1	46.4	0.1	16.1	32.6	2.7	2.0
	4	38.8	0.1	15.0	40.8	4.9	0.3
	8	36.3	0.1	12.6	46.4	4.5	0.1
<i>Netherlands</i>	0	65.0	0.5	6.7	27.8	0.0	0.0
	1	71.7	1.2	8.9	18.0	0.1	0.0
	4	66.6	3.5	11.7	17.3	0.8	0.2
	8	66.2	5.9	10.5	15.6	0.9	1.0
<i>Sweden</i>	0	43.3	0.1	27.1	29.5	0.0	0.0
	1	54.2	0.2	15.8	28.3	1.1	0.4
	4	48.7	2.3	4.3	38.5	3.1	3.2
	8	44.5	2.8	1.8	41.5	4.4	5.1
<i>Switzerland</i>	0	25.0	0.4	10.8	63.9	0.0	0.0
	1	28.3	1.8	7.7	58.1	0.9	3.2
	4	28.5	1.8	5.1	52.6	4.6	7.3
	8	26.6	1.5	2.7	50.2	12.1	6.8

Table A2
Variance decomposition of PPI

Country	Forecast Horizon	Percentage of forecast variance attributed to:					
		oil prices	output gap	exch. rate	import pr.	PPI	CPI
<i>United States</i>	0	38.9	0.8	0.2	12.1	48.0	0.0
	1	54.4	4.2	0.1	8.1	31.4	1.8
	4	50.5	12.4	0.1	13.2	21.9	1.9
	8	44.0	22.5	1.8	12.8	16.4	2.5
<i>Japan</i>	0	3.3	11.6	0.0	21.1	63.9	0.0
	1	20.3	5.4	1.2	28.7	44.3	0.1
	4	53.2	1.3	0.7	16.6	27.4	0.7
	8	53.8	2.6	1.1	12.8	29.3	0.4
<i>Germany</i>	0	22.6	2.0	5.5	43.3	26.6	0.0
	1	30.8	7.7	3.7	40.6	17.1	0.0
	4	34.1	13.6	7.2	38.5	6.5	0.0
	8	35.1	16.3	5.9	39.4	3.2	0.0
<i>France</i>	0	12.3	1.3	0.7	32.7	52.9	0.0
	1	19.9	2.7	1.0	28.6	47.6	0.3
	4	20.9	3.3	1.5	19.7	49.4	5.2
	8	15.6	5.3	0.5	17.9	48.6	12.2
<i>United Kingdom</i>	0	15.9	1.1	0.1	8.7	74.2	0.0
	1	22.4	0.4	1.1	7.6	68.5	0.1
	4	28.2	2.3	3.3	13.0	51.8	1.4
	8	27.4	6.9	4.0	11.7	47.8	2.2
<i>Belgium</i>	0	50.8	0.0	8.0	12.9	28.3	0.0
	1	43.8	0.1	12.0	17.8	25.5	0.8
	4	32.9	0.3	14.1	32.8	19.7	0.2
	8	32.2	0.5	12.0	39.8	15.2	0.3
<i>Netherlands</i>	0	23.7	0.7	1.3	4.0	70.3	0.0
	1	42.5	0.5	1.4	8.7	46.4	0.5
	4	67.8	4.8	5.4	5.9	14.8	1.2
	8	68.3	5.9	6.0	5.4	12.0	2.4
<i>Sweden</i>	0	24.9	9.0	7.0	34.7	24.5	0.0
	1	31.8	6.5	3.8	35.8	22.1	0.0
	4	31.6	4.7	0.9	43.7	17.6	1.5
	8	28.7	2.8	0.3	45.8	18.6	3.8
<i>Switzerland</i>	0	1.2	2.6	0.6	33.3	62.3	0.0
	1	5.9	5.0	0.5	37.4	51.1	0.1
	4	10.2	5.9	0.3	32.7	49.1	1.8
	8	9.8	5.2	0.5	26.5	56.4	1.7

Table A3
Variance decomposition of CPI

Country	Forecast Horizon	Percentage of forecast variance attributed to:					
		oil prices	output gap	exch. rate	import pr.	PPI	CPI
<i>United States</i>	0	32.1	8.5	0.2	10.1	7.1	42.0
	1	44.4	13.3	0.8	8.1	9.6	23.9
	4	43.1	24.3	0.2	8.7	9.0	14.9
	8	35.9	32.5	1.6	8.9	10.2	10.9
<i>Japan</i>	0	1.9	7.7	0.2	8.0	15.5	66.7
	1	4.1	4.1	0.6	13.9	17.2	60.0
	4	22.0	1.0	0.6	15.0	29.0	32.3
	8	31.3	1.8	0.2	10.9	33.7	22.1
<i>Germany</i>	0	7.6	2.4	0.5	6.4	2.1	80.9
	1	18.4	1.3	2.8	14.9	3.6	59.0
	4	25.3	9.5	8.0	19.2	2.2	35.9
	8	26.0	24.4	6.6	18.6	1.1	23.3
<i>France</i>	0	1.3	0.3	5.3	7.8	34.5	50.7
	1	3.5	0.5	5.0	12.8	38.0	40.1
	4	4.3	2.4	1.4	16.3	42.6	32.9
	8	4.6	6.0	0.8	16.0	40.8	32.0
<i>United Kingdom</i>	0	3.2	2.5	0.9	2.3	45.3	45.7
	1	6.3	2.6	1.1	4.3	52.0	33.8
	4	14.5	5.7	0.2	10.6	42.7	26.2
	8	18.2	15.4	0.4	10.0	39.5	16.7
<i>Belgium</i>	0	40.7	3.1	1.5	1.8	4.8	48.1
	1	42.6	3.4	3.8	3.4	19.8	27.1
	4	24.4	3.7	9.2	9.6	29.2	23.9
	8	19.6	1.3	10.2	16.3	30.4	22.2
<i>Netherlands</i>	0	5.4	6.3	6.2	6.7	4.4	71.1
	1	14.7	10.1	12.8	4.0	2.0	56.5
	4	32.4	14.3	13.7	3.5	0.3	35.8
	8	40.7	19.7	12.1	3.0	0.5	23.9
<i>Sweden</i>	0	1.3	7.7	1.1	9.6	3.8	76.6
	1	3.7	7.0	4.0	12.7	4.4	68.2
	4	15.6	4.0	1.6	21.2	6.9	50.6
	8	21.5	8.3	0.4	27.0	9.8	32.9
<i>Switzerland</i>	0	19.8	0.1	0.0	6.2	3.6	70.3
	1	36.8	1.0	0.0	7.2	6.7	48.2
	4	35.0	8.1	2.1	11.5	31.2	12.2
	8	24.3	13.0	3.2	13.7	41.8	4.1