



***Capital Flow Waves:
Surges, Stops, Flight
and Retrenchment***

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Motivation

- Substantial volatility in cross-border capital flows
 - Long history of “waves”, of booms and busts
- Can have substantial economic costs
 - Surges correlated with real estate booms, banking crises, debt defaults, inflation and currency crises
 - Aizenman and Jinjarek (2009), Caballero (2010), Reinhart and Reinhart (2009)
 - Sudden stops correlated with currency depreciations, slower growth and higher interest rates
 - Edwards (2005), Freund and Warnock (2007)
- But can also stabilize economies
 - Evidence from recent Global Financial Crisis
- Our question: What causes these extreme movements or “waves” in capital flows?

This Paper: 3 Contributions

1. New methodology to identify capital flow episodes
 - Other work uses net capital flow proxies
 - Our methodology analyzes gross capital flows disaggregated by foreign & domestic investors
2. Evaluate relevance of theoretical models on capital flow volatility, crises and surges
 - Global versus contagion versus domestic factors
 - Relevance of recent theoretical emphasis on global factors driving GFC
3. Understand these events to guide policy responses

Outline

1. Measuring Capital Flow Episodes

- Our approach
- Comparison to previous work

2. Explaining the Episodes


- The theory
- The evidence

3. Conclusions

***Measuring Capital
Flow Episodes***



Our Approach



- Builds on literature on “sudden stops”, similar approach in recent work on “bonanzas”
- Calvo (1998), Calvo et al. (2004), Reinhart and Reinhart (2009), Caballero (2010)

Our Approach


- More specifically, to calculate a surge or stop:
 - Let C_t be a 4-quarter moving sum of gross capital inflows from foreigners (GINFLOW):

$$C_t = \sum_{i=0}^3 GINFLOW_{t-i}$$

$$\Delta C_t = C_t - C_{t-4}$$

- A surge is when ΔC_t increases more than 1 standard deviation above its rolling historical mean, provided:
 - ΔC_t increases at least 2 sd at some point in episode
 - The entire episode lasts more than 1 quarter
 - Country has at least 4 years of data to calculate historic mean
- Stop is defined symmetrically

Surges & Stops for Brazil




Some Data Specifics

- Main data: IMF's, IFS
 - Augment with data from country authorities
- Resulting dataset: 58 countries from 1980-2009
 - Coverage substantially better at end of sample
- Baseline definitions:
 - Gross inflows: sum of inflows of direct investment, portfolio inflows & other inflows
 - Gross (private) outflows: sum of outflows of direct investment, portfolio, and other outflows with reserve accumulation omitted


Share of Countries with a Surge

Share of countries experiencing a sudden surge episode
(for TO capital flows)




Share of Countries with a Stop

Share of countries experiencing a sudden stop episode
(for TO capital flows)



Share of Countries with Retrenchment

Share of countries experiencing a sudden retrench episode
(for TO capital flows)




Comparison to Earlier Methodology

- Main similarities with past work:
 - Focus on periods of “extreme” capital flow movements, not daily flows
 - Define episodes versus rolling historic mean
- Main differences with past work:
 - Use capital flow data rather than current-account based proxies
 - **Use data on gross flows instead of net flows**
 - Also done in Broner et al (2010), Milesi-Ferretti & Tille (2010)
 - **Examine more types of episodes—both sudden increases & decreases in flows driven by domestic versus foreign residents**

Example: Chile

Net and Gross Flows for Chile



Explaining the Episodes



Theory

- Extensive literature on cross-country allocation of investment, contagion & capital flow cycles
 - “Push” or external factors
 - Includes global effects & contagion
 - “Pull” or domestic factors
- Global Factors—outside a country’s control, affects world
 - **Risk/risk appetite/probability of disaster:**
 - Gourio, Siemer and Verdelhan (2010), Bacchetta and Van Wincoop (2010), Dedola and Lombardo (2010),
 - Recent emphasis of theoretical work on Great Recession, motivated by Rose and Spiegel (2009)
 - **Liquidity/leverage/bank run models**
 - Devereux and Yetman (2010), Calvo (2009), Giannetti (2007), Brunnermeier (2009)
 - **Interest rates**
 - Calvo, Leiderman and Reinhart (1993, 1996)
 - **Growth**
 - Albuquerque, Loayza, and Servén (2005)

Theory

- Contagion Effects –outside of country's control, resulting from circumstances in another country or group of countries (but not world); Claessens and Forbes, 2001, Dungey et al, 2011
 - **Regional effects**
 - **Trade channels**
 - Glick and Rose (1999), Forbes (2002)
 - **Financial channels**
 - Peek and Rosengreen (1997), Kaminsky, Lyons and Schmukler (2001)
- Domestic Factors—country-specific characteristics
 - **Financial system size, depth and fragility**
 - Caballero, Farhi and Gourinchas (2008), Mendoza, Quadrini, and Rios-Rull (2009), Bacchetta and Benhima (2010), Forbes (2010), Ju and Wei (2011), Dekle and Kletzer (2001), Mendoza and Terrones (2008)
 - Recent focus of work on global imbalances
 - **Capital controls, integration with global financial markets**
 - Ostry et al. (2010, 2011), Milesi-Ferretti and Tille (2010), Aghion, Bacchetta and Banerjee (2004)
 - **Fiscal position/solvency**
 - **Technological shocks/TOT shocks/growth**
 - Aguiar and Gopinath (2007)

Regression Analysis

- Estimate conditional probability of having a surge, stop, flight or retrenchment in a quarter

$$Prob(e_{it}=1)=F(\phi_t, \gamma_{it}, \alpha_{it})$$

- e_{it} is dummy=1 for each episode (surge, stop, flight, retrenchment)
- ϕ_t : global factors
- γ_{it} : contagion variables
- α_{it} : domestic variables
- Estimation issue: cdf of $F(\cdot)$ is skewed (85% of episodes=0)
 - Therefore focus on complimentary logarithmic estimator (cloglog) which assumes the cdf of $F(\cdot)$ is the extreme value distribution,

$$F(z) = 1 - \exp [-\exp(z)]$$

- Seemingly unrelated regression estimation to allow for cross-episode correlation in errors
- Robust standard errors, clustered by country

The Components

- Global factor
 - Global risk: VXO, VIX, quality spread, CSFB Risk Appetite index, Variance Risk Premium (VRP)
 - Global liquidity: growth in money supply in largest economies, private credit growth by financial institutions./GDP
 - Global interest rates: Avg LT rate in US, euro & Japan, just US
 - Global productivity: global GDP growth
- Contagion factor:
 - Geographic proximity; episode in country in same region
 - Trade linkages: based on bilateral trade flows
 - Financial linkages: based on bilateral bank exposure
- Domestic factor
 - Financial market depth: stock market cap/GDP, stock & bond mkt cap/GDP, ROE of banking system
 - Capital controls: general controls, intl assets & liabilities/GDP, specific controls, FX regulation, financial regulation
 - Fiscal position: public debt to GDP
 - Productivity shocks: country GDP growth relative to trend or WEO forecast
 - GDP per capita

Results

- Robust results:
 - Global risk: most consistently significant factor predicting all episodes—driven by foreigners and domestics
 - Global growth & domestic productivity shocks: significant predicting foreign capital flows (surges & stops)
 - Contagion: through financial and trade linkages significant in predicting stops and retrenchment
- Robust non-results:
 - No evidence that capital controls reduce incidence of episodes driven by foreigners
 - Less important role of global liquidity and global interest rates after controlling for risk

Closer Look at Risk Measures

- Measures that combined changes in economic risk (uncertainty etc) and changes in risk aversion
 - VXO, VIX, quality spread
 - Significant in predicting all episodes (except flight)
- Measures that isolate changes in risk aversion/risk appetite
 - Volatility Risk Premium (VRP)-Zhou (2010) and Credit Suisse First Boston Risk Appetite Index (RAI)
 - Significant in predicting stops by foreigners
- Suggest is changes in overall economic risk that are most important factors driving all types of capital flow episodes
 - Changes in risk appetite/risk aversion only important in driving sudden stops driven by foreigners

Conclusions

- New methodology to understand capital flow waves
 - Important to examine gross flows by type of investor
 - Very different results than traditional approach using net flows (especially for role of risk)
- Global & contagion factors most important determinants of surges, stops, flight & retrenchment episodes
 - Supports recent focus in theoretical literature on global risk
 - Little evidence supporting effectiveness of capital controls
- For policymakers seeking to reduce capital flow volatility, is an important role for global institutions and cross-country cooperation
 - Domestic policies may be better aimed at managing the volatility in capital flows (prudential regulations, etc) rather than directly reducing the volatility