# TREASURY AND FEDERAL RESERVE FOREIGN EXCHANGE OPERATIONS

July-September 2008


During the third quarter of 2008, the dollar's trade-weighted exchange value appreciated 7.3 percent, as measured by the Federal Reserve Board's major currencies index. The dollar appreciated 11.8 percent against the euro, but depreciated 0.1 percent against the yen. These exchange rate movements reflected rising concerns about the growth outlook for overseas economies relative to the U.S. economy, particularly as tensions in the global credit and funding markets intensified to historically extreme levels. The U.S. monetary authorities did not intervene in the foreign exchange markets during the quarter.

During the quarter, the euro—U.S. dollar currency pair traded in three distinct periods. For most of July, the dollar continued to trade near its all-time low against the euro, as concern over the health of the U.S. financial sector and its impact on the U.S. macroeconomic outlook weighed on sentiment toward the dollar. However, from the last week of July to the first week of September, the dollar appreciated broadly, as economic data indicated that growth prospects in many overseas economies were deteriorating sharply. Over the remainder of the quarter, the dollar traded in a wide range, as investors expressed great concern and uncertainty over both the global economic outlook and the health of global financial markets.

Reacting to historically elevated demand for dollar funding, during the quarter the Federal Reserve Bank of New York announced several increases in the size of the temporary currency swap facilities with the European Central Bank (ECB) and the Swiss National Bank (SNB). The New York Fed also authorized new facilities and renewed arrangements with the Bank of England (BoE), the Bank of Japan (BoJ), the Bank of Canada (BoC), the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA), Sveriges Riksbank, Norges Bank, and the Danmarks Nationalbank.<sup>1</sup>


This report, presented by William Dudley, Executive Vice President, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, and Manager of the System Open Market Account, describes the foreign exchange operations of the U.S. Department of the Treasury and the Federal Reserve System for the period from July through September 2008. Alex Cohen was primarily responsible for preparation of the report.

Chart 1
TRADE-WEIGHTED U.S. DOLLAR




Sources: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System; Bloomberg L.P.

Chart 2 EURO–U.S. DOLLAR EXCHANGE RATE



Source: Bloomberg L.P.

Chart 3
U.S. DOLLAR-YEN EXCHANGE RATE



# DOLLAR TRADES IN RANGE AGAINST THE EURO DESPITE CONTINUED CONCERNS ABOUT THE U.S. ECONOMIC OUTLOOK

During the first three weeks of July, the euro—U.S. dollar exchange rate continued to trade within the range of approximately \$1.56 to \$1.60, while reaching an all-time high of about \$1.6040 per euro on July 15. During this period, sentiment toward the dollar remained relatively negative as concerns persisted about the impact of weakness in the U.S. financial and housing sectors on the real economy. These concerns were underscored by the failure in mid-July of California-based mortgage bank IndyMac Bank, F.S.B.—the second largest bank bankruptcy in U.S. history. In addition, during this period, concerns about the solvency of government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac intensified, as various news articles and analyst reports speculated that a government takeover of—or government support for—the firms may be necessary. On July 13, the U.S. Treasury and the Federal Reserve announced that they would provide Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac with back-stop liquidity. This announcement was generally viewed favorably, as it was perceived to reduce concerns about possible systemic risk in the U.S. financial sector and provide support to the housing sector.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> See <a href="http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20080929a.htm">http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20080929a.htm</a>.

Throughout this period, market participants remained highly attuned to the relative growth prospects for the U.S. and overseas economies. Many investors continued to express optimism that overseas economic activity could remain resilient, despite widespread expectations for a U.S. economic slowdown. In the United States, growth data were mixed, as softer business confidence and retail sales data were countered by relatively better-than-expected industrial production and unemployment data. In addition, the front-month West Texas Intermediate (WTI) crude oil futures contract reached a record level of \$147.27 per barrel, before moderating significantly over the remainder of the quarter.

Investor sentiment toward the euro-area economic outlook remained more favorable than sentiment toward the U.S. outlook, despite some euro-area data showing signs of slowing economic activity. On July 3, the ECB, citing lingering inflationary pressures, increased its policy rate by 25 basis points, to 4.25 percent. However, official commentary noting growth concerns and subsequent weaker-than-expected data encouraged many investors to anticipate that a cyclical turning point in euro-area economic activity had arrived. This shift in expectations for relative growth prospects between the United States and the euro area also increasingly led many market observers to suggest that the multiyear trend of dollar depreciation against the euro might soon end.

## DOLLAR RISES AGAINST MOST MAJOR CURRENCIES DURING THE MIDDLE OF THE QUARTER, AS GROWTH PROSPECTS IN OVERSEAS ECONOMIES DECLINE

From the last week of July to the first week of September, the dollar appreciated against most major currencies, as signs of deteriorating growth prospects in overseas economies led many investors to discredit the notion that economic activity in these countries could "decouple" from the United States. The dollar's trade-weighted exchange value, as measured by the Federal Reserve Board's major currencies index, appreciated approximately 9.5 percent over this period. The deterioration of global growth prospects was also evident in the sharp fall in commodity prices, particularly the front-month WTI crude oil futures contract, which by the end of August had declined roughly 21 percent from its record high in July.

U.S. dollars per barrel U.S. dollars per barrel 160 160 140 140 120 120 100 100 80 80 60 60 40 40 O1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q3 Q2

2008

Chart 4
FRONT-MONTH WEST TEXAS INTERMEDIATE CRUDE OIL FUTURES CONTRACT

Source: Bloomberg L.P.

2007

From the last week of July to the first week of September, the dollar appreciated approximately 13.7 percent against the euro, as investors sharply downgraded their economic outlook for the euroarea economy. Foreign exchange moves were driven by a series of below-expectations euro-area data releases, including the German IFO Business Climate index on July 24 and the release of euro-area GDP in mid-August. Consistently, policy expectations in the euro area shifted noticeably. Following the ECB's August 7 policy meeting, some market participants expressed disappointment that President Jean-Claude Trichet did not show greater willingness to lower policy rates, given the sharp pace at which euro-area growth appeared to be slowing. Following the meeting, rates implied by the EONIA (Euro Overnight Index Average) swap curve declined, reflecting expectations that the ECB would leave policy rates unchanged over the next twelve months. This outlook for ECB policy rates contrasted sharply with market expectations at the beginning of the quarter, when the EONIA swap curve had implied about two full 25-basis-point policy rate increases over the same time horizon.

In contrast, U.S. economic data for the beginning of the quarter were interpreted more positively. In particular, employment, consumer confidence, housing, and manufacturing data generally exceeded market participants' expectations. At the end of July, comments from several Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) members were interpreted as emphasizing the upside risks to inflation, a development that led some investors to speculate that the FOMC's series of policy rate cuts might soon near a conclusion. Expectations for future FOMC policy rate increases grew, as reflected by the 25-basis-point rise in rates implied by the June 2009 eurodollar futures contract

during the third week of July. Consistent with these significant shifts in sentiment toward relative growth prospects for the United States and the euro area as well as interest rate expectations, in early September the dollar rose to about \$1.39 per euro, its highest level in almost a year.

However, from the last week of July to the first week of September, the U.S. dollar was generally little changed against the Japanese yen, trading within a range of ¥105 to ¥111 per dollar. Many suggested that the perception that Japan's financial sector was more insulated from the ongoing tightening of global credit and funding market conditions provided some support to the yen, despite signs of slowing Japanese economic activity.

This perceived deterioration of growth prospects led several foreign central banks to begin easing policy rates or increasingly highlight downside risks to growth. The Reserve Bank of New Zealand unexpectedly reduced its official cash rate by 25 basis points, to 8.25 percent, at its July meeting. The RBA left policy rates unchanged at 7.25 percent during its August policy meeting, but its accompanying statement highlighted rising downside risks to growth. Further, while the BoE also left its policy rate unchanged at its August Monetary Policy Committee meeting, its quarterly inflation report was interpreted as placing a greater emphasis on the downside risks to growth. During the period, the U.S. dollar appreciated between approximately 13 and 20 percent against the Australian dollar, New Zealand dollar, and British pound.

Concerns about the global economic outlook were quite evident in many emerging market currencies. During the quarter, the South Korean won and Brazilian *real* each depreciated approximately 20 percent against the dollar, and the South Korean KOSPI and Brazilian Bovespa equity indexes declined 13.5 and 23.8 percent, respectively. Market participants attributed the price action in the Korean won to the deteriorating terms of trade and increasing current account deficit, given the adverse effect of slowing global growth on Korea's export sector. However, the Brazilian *real* depreciated as indications of slowing growth weighed on commodity prices, also resulting in a deterioration of terms of trade, given Brazil's reliance on commodity-related exports.

This shift in sentiment toward overseas growth prospects led international investors to make some significant portfolio adjustments—developments that benefited the dollar noticeably. In particular, as expectations for global growth fell, U.S. institutional investors, such as mutual funds and pension funds, began paring back their foreign investment holdings. Additionally, hedging activity among U.S.-based corporations, many of which reportedly chose to increase their currency-related hedges on their foreign businesses during this period, supported the dollar's broad appreciation.

Chart 5
AUSTRALIAN DOLLAR-U.S. DOLLAR AND BRITISH POUND-U.S. DOLLAR EXCHANGE RATES





Chart 6
U.S. DOLLAR–SOUTH KOREAN WON AND U.S. DOLLAR–BRAZILIAN REAL EXCHANGE RATES



Source: Bloomberg L.P.

The deterioration in global growth prospects and capital outflows prompted many emerging market central banks to intervene to support their domestic currencies. Subsequently, some of these central bank reserve managers sought to reduce their holdings of other non-dollar major currencies to maintain a relatively steady portfolio allocation across major currencies. Market participants reported that this rebalancing activity by a number of prominent emerging market central banks provided support to the dollar against both the euro and British pound.

### G-3 CURRENCIES TRADE IN WIDE RANGE AMID INTENSE CONCERN ABOUT THE HEALTH OF THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM

From the second week of September to the end of the third quarter, the dollar depreciated about 0.7 percent against the euro and about 1.5 percent against the Japanese yen. However, during this period, many major and emerging market currencies traded within historically wide ranges, and currency market volatility rose very sharply as concerns about the health of the global financial system intensified. The euro—U.S. dollar currency pair traded within a wide range of about \$1.39 to \$1.49 per euro, although it ended the quarter near \$1.41 per euro, close to its lowest level since October 2007.

The announcement on September 7 that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac would be placed in conservatorship was generally viewed positively by market participants, as it reduced uncertainty over the role of the GSEs in the financial system and their ability to provide support to the U.S. housing market and broader economy. However, concerns over the health of the U.S. financial sector increased sharply in mid-September after the investment bank Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. announced that it had filed for bankruptcy and the Federal Reserve announced that it would provide liquidity support for the insurance company American International Group (AIG) to facilitate an orderly settlement of its business. Asset market volatility increased as confidence in the global financial system fell amid counterparty credit concerns and related funding market strains. Additionally, global equity markets declined, and spreads on financial firms' credit default swaps widened sharply. Dealers reported that liquidity conditions in the foreign exchange markets deteriorated significantly as speculative activity declined substantially, and counterparty credit concerns became very elevated. In this environment, exchange rate movements were largely driven by a historically high level of risk aversion among investors, who sought to reallocate their portfolios by holding safer assets and paring back on riskier exposures. Market participants expressed significant concern and uncertainty about the macroeconomic impact of these

developments as well as the likely outlook for major exchange rates. Immediately following these developments, the dollar depreciated to about the \$1.47 level against the euro and near the ¥104 level against the yen.

During the final two weeks of the quarter, market participants were focused on the U.S. Treasury's Troubled Asset Relief Program and the ensuing Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (EESA). The initial reports of these initiatives provided some support to the dollar, which recovered against the euro, appreciating by about 4.6 percent. By the end of the third quarter, the U.S. House of Representatives failed to pass the initial version of the EESA,<sup>2</sup> prompting a sharp sell-off in global equity markets and broad flight-to-quality flows into global sovereign debt markets. In this environment, both the yen and U.S. dollar outperformed most other major and emerging market currencies, with the euro—U.S. dollar currency pair trading near the \$1.41 per euro level by the end of the quarter, close to the yearly high for the U.S. dollar. Sentiment toward the euro also deteriorated as comments from ECB officials continued to emphasize lingering inflationary risks. Consequently, many investors suggested that the euro area's real economic prospects could deteriorate significantly should the ECB not lower its policy rate at a faster pace.

The dollar's gains against the euro were supported by increasing concerns about the solvency of many European financial institutions. During the final weekend of the quarter, investors expressed great concern that several European financial institutions—including the Belgian-Dutch bank Fortis, the Belgian-French bank Dexia, and the U.K. mortgage bank Bradford and Bingley—had either been nationalized or required significant government capital injections. In addition, the German real estate company Hypo Real Estate announced plans to receive a sizable capital injection by a consortium of German banks. These developments added to negative sentiment toward the euro, as investors reacted to signs of intensifying strains on the European financial system. Notably, around this time, many market participants were focused on the Irish government's decision to place a two-year guarantee on all deposits, bonds, and debt of six Irish banks. Market participants suggested that the move highlighted the immediate need for a coordinated effort among euro-area policymakers to address potential solvency issues within the region's financial system. More generally, many market participants continued to express concern over the ECB's emphasis on lingering inflation risks, despite the significant strains on the global financial system and signs that euro-area growth was slowing dramatically.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> A modified version of the original EESA was passed by the Senate on October 1 and by the House of Representatives on October 3.


The yen outperformed most major and emerging market currency pairs during the final three weeks of the quarter. Elevated risk aversion toward the end of the quarter prompted a significant repatriation of capital by Japanese institutional and retail investors. Many of these investors pared back positions in higher yielding foreign investments as well as those in currencies considered sensitive to global growth and commodity prices. Additionally, the perception that the Japanese financial sector remained relatively healthy and that Japanese investors had limited exposure to overseas credit markets added to positive sentiment toward the yen. In September, the yen appreciated about 1.9 percent against the U.S. dollar to end the quarter at ¥106.11 per dollar, and appreciated between approximately 5 and 9 percent against the euro, Australian dollar, and New Zealand dollar.

### GLOBAL FUNDING AND FOREIGN EXCHANGE SWAP MARKET LIQUIDITY CONDITIONS DETERIORATE TO UNPRECEDENTED LEVELS

The sharp rise in counterparty credit concerns led to intense pressures in many global funding markets. Heightened demand for funding concurrent with elevated precautionary hoarding of cash by many institutions caused immense deterioration of term liquidity in both secured and unsecured lending markets. Many market participants reported that, as a result, some financial institutions were increasingly funding at very short-dated maturity tenors, leading to heightened concerns over potential rollover risks.


Global funding market pressures were evident in the virtual shut-down of the foreign exchange swap market. Dealers reported that bid-ask spreads on foreign exchange swaps widened to as much as ten times the levels that prevailed before August 2007. They also reported a widespread decline in interbank market making and exceptionally limited trading activity in term maturity tenors. The price action was reportedly driven by demand for dollar funding from global financial institutions, particularly European banks. As many of these institutions increasingly struggled to obtain funding in the unsecured cash markets, they turned to the collateralized foreign exchange swap market as a primary channel for raising dollar funding. This extreme demand for dollar funding led to a shift in foreign exchange forward prices, with the implied dollar funding rate observed in foreign exchange swaps on many major currencies rising sharply above that suggested by other relative interest rate measures such as the dollar OIS (Overnight Index Swap) rate and the dollar LIBOR (London Interbank Offered Rate). During the quarter, the spread of one- and three-month dollar rates implied by euro—U.S. dollar foreign exchange forward points over their respective dollar LIBOR fixing rate widened by around 415 and 245 basis points, respectively.

Chart 7
U.S. DOLLAR LIBOR-OVERNIGHT INDEX SWAP SPREAD



Note: LIBOR is the London Interbank Offered Rate.

Chart 8
U.S. DOLLAR INTEREST RATES, SEPTEMBER 30, 2008




Sources: Reuters; Bloomberg L.P.

Note: LIBOR is the London Interbank Offered Rate; OIS is the Overnight Index Swap rate.

# OPTION-IMPLIED VOLATILITY OF G-3 CURRENCIES RISES SHARPLY DURING THE THIRD QUARTER


Due to the elevated strains in global credit markets, option-implied volatility of most major and emerging market currencies rose to multiyear high levels. Option-implied volatility of the euro—U.S. dollar and U.S. dollar—yen currency pairs rose rapidly to levels last observed in 2000. Additionally, since mid-July, one-month option-implied volatility of the euro—U.S. dollar currency pair increased from about 9.6 percent to 17.1 percent, exceeding the levels observed in mid-March. The rise in option-implied currency market volatility was consistent with very sharp rises in volatility across global financial markets, as concerns about credit and funding market pressures intensified sharply.

Chart 9
ONE-MONTH AND ONE-YEAR EURO-U.S. DOLLAR IMPLIED VOLATILITY



Source: Bloomberg L.P.

Chart 10
ONE-MONTH AND ONE-YEAR U.S. DOLLAR-YEN IMPLIED VOLATILITY



# TEMPORARY RECIPROCAL CURRENCY ARRANGEMENTS EXPANDED WITH OTHER CENTRAL BANKS

To further address pressures in funding markets, throughout the quarter the FOMC authorized sizable increases in existing temporary reciprocal currency arrangements (swap lines) with the ECB and the SNB, while extending new swap lines to various central banks, as noted below.

Table 1
TEMPORARY RECIPROCAL CURRENCY ARRANGEMENTS
Billions of U.S. Dollars

Central Bank	Authorized Swap Line	
European Central Bank	240ª	
Swiss National Bank	$60_{\mathrm{P}}$	
Bank of England	80	
Bank of Japan	120	
Bank of Canada	30	
Reserve Bank of Australia	30	
Sveriges Riksbank	30	
Norges Bank	15	
Danmarks Nationalbank	15	

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>a</sup>Reflects an increase of \$190 billion over the previously authorized amount.

 $<sup>{}^{\</sup>rm b}{\rm Reflects}$  an increase of \$48 billion over the previously authorized amount.

#### TREASURY AND FEDERAL RESERVE FOREIGN EXCHANGE RESERVES

The U.S. monetary authorities did not undertake any intervention operations during the quarter. At the end of the quarter, the current value of the Federal Reserve System's Open Market Account holdings totaled \$304.5 billion—consisting of \$23.3 billion of foreign exchange reserve portfolio investments and \$281.2 billion carrying value of outstanding swaps with the ECB, SNB, BoE, BoJ, RBA, and Danmarks Nationalbank. The current value of the U.S. Treasury's Exchange Stabilization Fund totaled \$23.3 billion, comprised of euro and yen holdings. The U.S. monetary authorities invest their foreign currency balances in a variety of instruments that yield market-related rates of return and have a high degree of liquidity and credit quality. To the greatest extent practicable, the investments are split evenly between the System Open Market Account and the Exchange Stabilization Fund.

To facilitate the functioning of financial markets and provide liquidity in U.S. dollars abroad, on December 12, 2007, the FOMC authorized temporary reciprocal currency arrangements with the ECB and the SNB. Holdings related to these arrangements are included in the System Open Market Account for the first and second quarters.

As of September 24, the FOMC authorized increases in existing temporary reciprocal currency arrangements with the ECB and the SNB, and extended new swap lines to various central banks. As of September 29, the authorized swap line amounts were as follows: \$240 billion for the ECB, reflecting an increase of \$190 billion over the previously authorized amount; \$60 billion for the SNB, reflecting an increase of \$48 billion over the previously authorized amount; \$80 billion for the BoE; \$120 billion for the BoJ; \$30 billion for the BoC; \$30 billion for the RBA; \$30 billion for Sveriges Riksbank; \$15 billion for Norges Bank; and \$15 billion for the Danmarks Nationalbank.

All reciprocal currency arrangements have been authorized through April 30, 2009. As of September 30, the ECB had drawn down \$174.7 billion, the SNB had drawn down \$28.9 billion, the BoE had drawn down \$40.0 billion, the BoJ had drawn down \$29.6 billion, the RBA had drawn down \$10 billion, and the Danmarks Nationalbank had drawn down \$5 billion, while the BoC, Sveriges Riksbank, and Norges Bank had yet to draw down on their swap lines.

A significant portion of the U.S. monetary authorities' foreign exchange reserves is invested in European and Japanese government securities. On an outright basis, the U.S. monetary authorities hold German, French, and Japanese government securities. Under euro-denominated repurchase agreements, the U.S. monetary authorities accept sovereign debt backed by the full faith and credit of the following governments: Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Spain. Foreign currency reserves are also invested at the Bank for International Settlements and in facilities at other official institutions. As of September 30, direct holdings of foreign government securities totaled \$21.1 billion, split evenly between the System Open Market Account and the Exchange Stabilization Fund. Foreign government securities held under repurchase agreements totaled \$7.3 billion at the end of the quarter and were also split evenly between the two authorities.

 ${\it Table~2}$  FOREIGN CURRENCY HOLDINGS OF U.S. MONETARY AUTHORITIES BASED ON CURRENT EXCHANGE RATES

Millions of U.S. Dollars

			Change in	Balances by	Source	
	Carrying Value, June 30, 2008 <sup>a</sup>	Net Purchases and Sales <sup>b</sup>	Investment Earnings <sup>c</sup>		Unrealized Gains/ s Losses on Foreign Currency Revaluation <sup>e</sup>	Carrying Value, September 30, 2008 <sup>a</sup>
Federal Reserve System						
Open Market Account (SOMA)						
Euro	66,571.6	124,742.0	549.3	0	(7,474.1) <sup>f</sup>	184,388.7
Swiss franc	12,235.3	16,900.0	86.2	0	(883.5) <sup>f</sup>	28,338.1
Japanese yen	8,994.7	29,622.0	32.7	0	(86.5) <sup>f</sup>	38,563.0
Canadian dollar	0.0	0.0	0.0	0	0.0 <sup>f</sup>	0.0
British pound	0.0	39,999.0	29.4	0	$(1,109.3)^{f}$	38,919.1
Danish krone	0.0	5,000.0	0.5	0	$(178.7)^{f}$	4,821.8
Australian dollar	0.0	10,000.0	1.8	0	(537.5) <sup>f</sup>	9,464.2
Swedish krone	0.0	0.0	0.0	0	$0.0^{f}$	0.0
Norwegian krone	0.0	0.0	0.0	0	0.0 <sup>f</sup>	0.0
Total	87,801.6	226,263.0	699.9		(10,269.6)	304,494.9
U.S. Treasury Exchange						
Stabilization Fund (ESF)						
Euro	15,798.5	0	151.4	0	(1,679.5)	14,270.5
Japanese yen	8,994.7	_0_	16.0	_0_	19.8	9,030.5
Total	24,793.2		167.4		(1,659.7)	23,300.9

Note: Figures may not sum to totals because of rounding.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>a</sup> Carrying value of the reserve asset position includes interest accrued on foreign currency, which is based on "day of" accrual method.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>b</sup> Net purchases and sales include foreign currency purchases related to official activity, swap drawings and repayments, and warehousing.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>c</sup> Investment earnings include accrued interest and amortization on outright and swap-related holdings.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>d</sup> Gains and losses on sales are calculated using average cost.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>e</sup> Reserve asset balances are revalued daily at the noon buying rates.

 $<sup>^{</sup>m f}$  Valuation adjustments on swap-related euro and Swiss franc holdings do not affect profit and loss because the impact is offset by the unwinding of the forward contract at the repayment date.

 $\it Table~3$  Breakdown of Foreign reserve assets Held

Carrying Value in Millions of U.S. Dollars, as of September 30, 2008

	U.S. Treasury Exchange Stabilization Fund (ESF) <sup>a</sup>	Federal Reserve System Open Market Account (SOMA) <sup>a</sup>
Euro-denominated assets:	14,270.5	184,388.7
Cash held on deposit at official institutions	5,997.2	6,021.0
Other assets <sup>b</sup>	_	170,094.5
Marketable securities held under repurchase agreements <sup>c</sup>	3,651.6	3,651.6
Marketable securities held outright	4,621.6	4,621.6
German government securities	1,981.6	1,981.6
French government securities	2,640.0	2,640.0
Swiss-franc-denominated assets:	_	28,338.1
Other assets <sup>b</sup>	_	28,338.1
Yen-denominated assets:	9,030.5	38,563.0
Cash held on deposit at official institutions	3,108.8	3,108.8
Marketable securities held outright	5,921.6	5,921.6
Other assets <sup>b</sup>		29,532.5
Canadian-dollar-denominated assets:		0
Other assets <sup>b</sup>		0
British-pound-denominated assets:		38,919.1
Other assets <sup>b</sup>		38,919.1
Danish-krone-denominated assets:		4,821.8
Other assets <sup>b</sup>		4,821.8
Australian-dollar-denominated assets:		9,464.2
Other assets <sup>b</sup>		9,464.2
Swedish-krone-denominated assets:		0
Other assets <sup>b</sup>		0
Norwegian-krone-denominated assets:		0
Other assets <sup>b</sup>		0

Note: Figures may not sum to totals because of rounding.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>a</sup>As of September 30, the euro and yen portfolios had Macaulay durations of 9.1 months and 10.6 months, respectively, for both the ESF and SOMA portfolios.

bCarrying value of outstanding reciprocal currency swaps with the European Central Bank, the Swiss National Bank, the Bank of Japan, the Bank of Canada, the Bank of England, the Danmarks Nationalbank, the Reserve Bank of Australia, Sveriges Riksbank, and Norges Bank.

Sovereign debt obligations of Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Spain are presently eligible collateral for reverse repotransactions.

Table 4
RECIPROCAL CURRENCY ARRANGEMENTS
Millions of U.S. Dollars

Institution	Amount of Facility	Outstanding as of September 30, 2008
-	Federal Reserve System Op	oen Market Account (SOMA)
Bank of Canada	2,000	0
Bank of Mexico	3,000	0
European Central Bank <sup>a</sup>	240,000	174,742
Swiss National Bank <sup>a</sup>	60,000	28,900
Bank of Japan <sup>a</sup>	120,000	29,622
Bank of Canada <sup>a</sup>	30,000	0
Bank of England <sup>a</sup>	80,000	39,999
Danmarks Nationalbank <sup>a</sup>	15,000	5,000
Reserve Bank of Australia <sup>a</sup>	30,000	10,000
Sveriges Riksbank <sup>a</sup>	30,000	0
Norges Bank <sup>a</sup>	15,000	0
Total	625,000	288,263
	U.S. Treasury Exchange	e Stabilization Fund (ESF)
-		
Bank of Mexico	3,000	0
Total	3,000	0

 $<sup>^{\</sup>rm a}{\rm Temporary}$  swap arrangement.

Table 5
DAILY SWAP FACILITY ACTIVITY
U.S. Dollars

ate	Drawings	Repayments	Amount Outstanding
		European Central Bank	
3/08	25,000,000,000	25,000,000,000	50,000,000,000
17/08	25,000,000,000	25,000,000,000	50,000,000,000
31/08	25,000,000,000	25,000,000,000	50,000,000,000
14/08	30,000,000,000	25,000,000,000	55,000,000,000
28/08	20,000,000,000	25,000,000,000	50,000,000,000
1/08	20,000,000,000	20,000,000,000	50,000,000,000
8/08	40,000,000,000	20,000,000,000	90,000,000,000
9/08	40,000,000,000	40,000,000,000	90,000,000,000
22/08	40,000,000,000	40,000,000,000	90,000,000,000
3/08	40,000,000,000	40,000,000,000	90,000,000,000
24/08	40,000,000,000	40,000,000,000	90,000,000,000
25/08	65,000,000,000	60,000,000,000	95,000,000,000
26/08	65,000,000,000	40,000,000,000	120,000,000,000
29/08	30,000,000,000	30,000,000,000	120,000,000,000
0/08	84,742,000,000	30,000,000,000	174,742,000,000
08	6,000,000,000	6,000,000,000	12,000,000,000
7/08	6,000,000,000	6,000,000,000	12,000,000,000
/08	6,000,000,000	6,000,000,000	12,000,000,000
í/08	6,000,000,000	6,000,000,000	12,000,000,000
3/08	6,000,000,000	6,000,000,000	12,000,000,000
1/08	4,000,000,000	4,000,000,000	12,000,000,000
8/08	10,000,000,000	10,000,000	22,000,000,000
19/08	10,000,000,000	10,000,000,000	22,000,000,000
22/08	10,000,000,000	10,000,000,000	22,000,000,000
23/08	10,000,000,000	10,000,000,000	22,000,000,000
24/08	10,000,000,000	10,000,000,000	22,000,000,000
25/08	18,000,000,000	16,000,000,000	24,000,000,000
16/08	11,900,000,000	10,000,000,000	25,900,000,000
9/08	8,239,000,000	7,000,000,000	27,139,000,000
0/08	10,000,000,000	8,239,000,000	28,900,000,000
		Bank of Japan	
/08	29,622,000,000		29,622,000,000

Table 5
DAILY SWAP FACILITY ACTIVITY (CONTINUED)
U.S. Dollars

Date	Drawings	Repayments	Amount Outstanding
		Bank of Canada	
		Bank of England	
/18/08	14,050,000,000		14,050,000,000
/19/08	20,800,000,000	14,050,000,000	20,800,000,000
0/22/08	26,150,000,000	20,800,000,000	26,150,000,000
0/23/08	30,101,000,000	26,150,000,000	30,101,000,000
0/24/08	29,900,000,000	30,101,000,000	29,900,000,000
/25/08	35,045,000,000	29,900,000,000	35,045,000,000
/26/08	40,000,000,000	35,045,000,000	40,000,000,000
/29/08	9,999,000,000	10,000,000,000	39,999,000,000
/30/08	9,999,000,000	9,999,000,000	39,999,000,000
		Danmarks Nationalbank	
/30/08	5,000,000,000		5,000,000,000
		Reserve Bank of Australia	
/29/08	10,000,000,000		10,000,000,000
		Sveriges Riksbank	
		Norges Bank	