
### Tri-Party Repo Utility Design

Darrell Duffie
Stanford University


**FRBNY Conference** 

October, 2013


### Tri-Party Repo





### **Tri-party Repo Clearing**




### A systemic flaw










Buyer's other cash deposit accounts




### CPSS-IOSCO FMI Principle 9


"An FMI should conduct its money settlements in central-bank money where practical and available.

If central bank money is not used, an FMI should minimize and strictly control the credit and liquidity risk arising from the use of commercial bank money."


"One way an FMI could minimize these risks is to limit its activities and operations to clearing and settlement and closely related processes." (CHIPS)



# Securities are transferred into TPR accounts at custodians or central securities depositories



#### Collateral is allocated to shells




### Tri-party Repo Infrastructure


 Tri-party agent: issues confirmations and instructions for cash and collateral transfers.

 Securities custodian or depository: maintains securities accounts.


- Bank (or central bank): maintains cash deposit accounts; may also provide secured liquidity.
- **Settlement systems:** processes requests received for cash or securities transfers.



#### Cash lender diversification benefits




#### A dealer's economies of scale




Number of clearing facilities in use


### Clearing bank economies of scale



### Clearing bank economies of scale




#### Collateral substitutions




Time of day

### Collateral substitution in two steps




#### Intra-day credit is needed to unwind repos



#### Liquidity for unitary batch processing



#### Liquidity for sequential processing




### Tri-party Repo FMI Design Goals


- 1. Accessible accounts for cash and securities.
- 2. Low total operating costs.
- 3. Low risk of loss to survivors and "taxpayers."
- 4. Low settlement liquidity requirements.
- 5. Low tri-party agent conflicts of interest through provision of liquidity, collateral valuation, haircut setting, demands for cross-guarantees, continuation of service.
- 6. Low too-big-to-fail distortions.

### **Enabling mechanisms**

- 1. Cash settlement in central bank money, or narrow-bank deposits.
- 2. Securities held in secure depositories.
- 3. State of the art information technology.
- 4. Settlement finality.
- 5. Independent collateral valuation and haircuts.
- 6. Exemption from automatic stay.
- 7. Enforceable netting.
- 8. Access to central bank lending of last resort.


### Liquidity to Financial Market Infrastructure






Time of day


#### Real-Time Gross Settlement



#### **Deferred Net Settlement**



#### Loss mutualization via CCP




### A few of the dangerous scenarios

- 1. The TPR agent bank is weakened by unrelated losses. TPR is stopped. Or, dealers or clients are unwilling to place funds in cash clearing account to mature repos. Repos terminate early; collateral held by cash lenders.
- 2. A dealer fails. The cash investors or clearing bank hold a fire sale of collateral securities.
- 3. A dealer is in trouble. Cash investors fail to settle purchase leg. Or, the TPR agent is unwilling to provide interim liquidity to unwind repos. Dealer is unable to obtain other financing. Collateral fire sale and dealer failure.


### **Clearing Bank**

- 1. Capital requirement based on maximum intra-day balance sheet potential exposure to collateral that it could receive that is not eligible for financing at central bank.
- 2. Unencumbered liquid assets covering maximum potential draw.
- 3. Settlement unwind: settlement finality.
- 4. Access to contingent lender of last resort.


### Central Bank Emergency Liquidity



### Broad Programmatic Credit Facilities




## Lending of Last Resort



#### Limited liquidity to an affiliated dealer






#### Bear Stearns' Liquidity Pool Over its Last Days (\$ billions) 26 27 28 10 11 12 13 **February** March

Data Source: Cox (2008)


Lehman's tri-party repo book




Source: Copeland, Martin, Walker (2011) FRBNY

#### September 2008 Run on Money Market Funds


Institutional investment in prime money market mutual funds




#### Money Market Fund Capital Buffers



#### Money Market Funds





#### Current Reform of Tri-Party Repo Infrastructure



