| Timothy
F. Geithner, President and Chief Executive Officer
Remarks by President Timothy F. Geithner
before the New York Bankers Association's Annual Financial
Services Forum
It is a pleasure to join you at the New York
Bankers Association Financial Services Forum. The institutions
represented in this room, together with the rest of the New
York financial community, remain at the center of the U.S.
and global financial systems.
Your meeting today takes place against the backdrop of a relatively
favorable national and global economic outlook. The U.S. financial
system is in reasonably strong shape. Financial innovation
has enabled substantial improvements in the quality of risk
management and in the capacity of the system to handle shocks.
But the benefits of innovation have come with significant
challenges to the people who run financial institutions and
to those responsible for supervision and oversight. How effective
we are in responding to these challenges will determine whether
the U.S. financial system is as successful in the future as
it has been in the past.
The consensus forecast for the U.S. economy expects solid
growth this year and next, somewhat above the upper bound
of the range of most estimates of U.S. potential growth. Confidence
in the sustainability of the U.S. expansion, as measured by
changes in these forecasts, for example, seems to be increasing.
The rate of economic growth outside the United States is also
looking better. Although there are pockets of weakness and
potential sources of vulnerability, the overall rate of global
growth has accelerated significantly and looks as if it’s
now running at the strongest levels in four years.
The broad measures of U.S. consumer price inflation are very
low. Inflation expectations as reflected in surveys and in
the Treasury inflation-protected securities, although higher
than current rates, still suggest an outlook of very modest
future price increases. Deflation risks worldwide appear to
have diminished, and there are some signs of accelerating
price increases in some economies. Overall, however, despite
the sharp increases in energy and commodity prices, the inflation
outlook globally appears quite benign.
At the core of the U.S. economic experience of the past decade
is a significant and sustained acceleration in productivity
growth. This offers the prospect of more rapid growth in income
over time, both for the United States and for the rest of
the world.
In the economics profession, there is a debate about whether
we are in the midst of a secular trend characterized by lower
GDP volatility and general price stability, which some have
called the “great moderation.” As important as
the question of the extent of this moderation in macroeconomic
volatility is the debate over its source. It’s undoubtedly
the result of a combination of factors, including better economic
policy, innovation and globalization, plus simple good fortune
in the form of smaller shocks. But, the relative contribution
of these factors is uncertain.
Despite the uncertainty that exists about the sources and
durability of this apparent moderation in some types of risks,
financial market prices now reflect a very benign view of
economic and credit fundamentals. Credit spreads generally
and risk premia in many asset classes are at levels that are
very low even in relation to previous periods of relative
optimism.
The U.S. financial system, when judged by many conventional
measures, looks reasonably healthy as well. Bank profitability
is at the highest levels we have seen, depending on which
measure you choose, in two to three decades. Capital positions
for U.S. banks, which have been around 13 percent of assets
over the past two years, are very strong, significantly above
the regulatory standards required to be considered well capitalized.
Asset quality also remains robust. Nonperforming loan ratios
are now only 1.2 percent across the commercial banking industry.
The financial markets are pricing financial institution risk
at very favorable levels, with bank equity prices, subordinated
debt spreads, and credit default swap spreads suggesting a
high degree of investor and counterparty confidence in the
financial health of the major banks and other financial institutions.
As these numbers suggest, the U.S. financial system came through
the recent recession, the spate of corporate bankruptcies,
the sharp adjustment in some asset prices, and the difficulties
in some emerging market economies in reasonably strong financial
shape. This apparent resilience, relative to past downturns
and relative to the experience of other countries, is the
result of a number of factors. Some of these factors stem
from developments outside the financial system, like better
macroeconomic policy and better microeconomic or supply-side
fundamentals. And some stem from changes in the nature of
financial intermediation, the structure of the financial system,
and the capacity of financial institutions to manage risk.
To start with the broader economic context, the strength and
length of the expansion of the 1990s helped ensure that U.S.
financial institutions entered the latest recession with strong
capital positions. The fact that the recession was shallower
and shorter than the average of the past helped limit the
scale and scope of losses to financial institutions. The forcefulness
of the monetary policy response and the large fiscal stimulus
provided by the tax cuts and expenditure increases played
a significant role in limiting the depth of the downturn and
in helping to bring about the recovery. It is significant
that the yield curve has been steeper and stayed steep longer
in this latest recession than in the previous one. And, finally,
the stronger microeconomic fundamentals of the U.S. economy--the
shift to just-in-time inventory management, the speed of innovation
in the U.S. economy, and other factors that seem to have reduced
the amplitude of the business cycle and improved the flexibility
and resilience of the U.S. economy in response to shocks—have
also contributed to financial stability.
Changes in the nature of financial intermediation have also
played a role in improving the overall resilience and performance
of the U.S. financial system that was evident in this latest
period of economic recession and financial stress. Four different
types of changes are particularly important.
- Innovation in financial technology continues to expand
the opportunities for financial institutions to separate
and distribute, and to manage and hedge, different types
of risk.
- The increasingly greater role played by the capital markets
in the financial intermediation process relative to banks
– both relative to the past and compared with most
other major economies – has improved the capacity
of our system to handle stress. Loans and securities held
by commercial banks today account for less than 20 percent
of overall U.S. credit market debt, roughly two-thirds of
their 1975 levels.
- The increases in the sophistication of risk management
techniques and enhancements to risk management processes
have delivered substantial improvements in how banks and
other financial institutions actually manage risk in practice.
Banks, for example, have aligned their pricing of credit
products much more closely with credit risk.
- The increased scale of cross-border financial intermediation,
the growing role of securitized financial instruments in
those overall flows, and the growth in the size and breadth
of financial institutions with global operations may also
mean that, as shocks are transmitted more rapidly, they
are diffused more broadly.
These are positive developments, and they are likely to be
enduring. But they have come with new challenges for those
of you who manage financial institutions and for those of
us charged with supervision and market oversight. The overall
return on these changes will depend on the skill with which
we manage the challenges that come with them. Among these
challenges are those that relate to the complexity of financial
and operational risk management, concentration in critical
markets, internal governance to manage conflicts, the quality
of public disclosure, opportunities for regulatory and capital
arbitrage, and trend amplifying market dynamics in times of
stress.
The financial innovations that have made risk transfer and
hedging possible have increased the complexity of risk management,
both financial and operational. The seemingly simple structure
of a loan or bond issue can now involve a complex series of
additional transactions that seek to allocate risks and responsibilities
along specialized lines. This increased number of transactions
that need to be separately settled and tracked by themselves
create new risks that must be managed.
The economies of scale inherent in certain activities have
led to a significant degree of concentration in some markets.
A relatively small number of dealers account for a very large
share of the over-the-counter derivatives business, with higher
degrees of concentration in specific markets such as interest-rate
options. Two institutions dominate the government securities
clearing business. The growth in the size of government-sponsored
mortgage entities creates a high degree of concentration in
a market with very large systemic implications. Concentration
has benefits, but it necessarily increases the vulnerability
of the system to an operational or financial disruption in
a single institution, or the decision by a single institution
to exit a particular business. Moreover, to the extent that
the same set of firms play dominant roles in multiple markets,
this concentration can also give rise to linkages between
markets that are not apparent in normal circumstances and
that could potentially affect how the financial system functions
in conditions of acute stress.
Increased opportunities for diversification offer the prospect--though
not the assurance—of lower overall volatility in earnings,
but they also bring much more complicated management challenges
in controlling conflicts, reputational risks, and operational
risks. The actual gains achieved from diversification depend
on the correlation of movements in different sources of earnings
and in economic growth among different regions as well as
the relative volatility of the new business lines into which
the institution is diversifying. To the extent that diversification
achieves lower overall volatility in earnings for the major
financial institutions, it is clearly good for the stability
of the system. But to fully exploit these potential gains
requires careful attention to the design of the control and
compliance infrastructure, to monitoring and managing credit
risk and concentration across diverse types of financial activities,
and to managing conflicts of interest.
These are formidable challenges even for the strongest management
teams. Trust and reputation are valuable competitive assets
for financial institutions, and the desire to preserve those
assets creates a powerful incentive for firms to manage conflicts
and compliance with exceptional care. Supervision and regulation,
and the enforcement response to management failures, should
help strengthen the incentives for a stronger compliance infrastructure,
but they cannot insulate firms from the consequences of reputational
damage.
Financial innovation has made it possible for the market to
assign values to a broader range of financial activities.
And this, combined with improved disclosure, has increased
the potential power of market discipline. But the increased
complexity that comes with innovation also creates challenges
for investor and counterparty risk assessment. Although the
overall quality of disclosure has improved in recent years,
along with accounting and auditing processes that underpin
the integrity of disclosure, the complexity of public financial
reporting can make it very difficult to discern the true picture
of a firm’s financial condition and its exposure to
risk.
Financial innovation has also made it possible for risk to
migrate to--and for leverage to accumulate in--parts of the
financial system with less strong, or simply different, supervision,
capital requirements, or disclosure norms. Risk today, on
balance, seems to be allocated more effectively to those institutions
better able to manage and hold it, resulting in reduced risk
to banks and to the financial system as a whole. However,
limitations in the extent of public disclosure over institutions
that hold large amounts of risk make it hard to develop a
comprehensive picture. It is obviously in the interest of
institutions that transfer credit risk, interest rate risk,
or other risks to understand the performance capabilities
of those institutions from which they are purchasing protection.
The ability to arrive at informed independent judgments about
counterparty risk, however, can be hindered by the gaps that
remain in the quality of disclosure.
The same developments in financial technology that have improved
the sophistication of risk management and the ability to transfer
risk can create positive feedback mechanisms that, for at
least short periods of time, amplify large moves in asset
prices. There have been substantial increases over the past
decade in the capacity of the market, meaning the principal
dealers, to handle very large increases in hedging-related
flows. This dimension of the financial infrastructure is critical
to the capacity of our markets to absorb and respond to large
shocks. Dynamic hedging of options and other similar strategies,
however, depend on the availability of sufficient liquidity
to work effectively. Stressful periods, of course, are marked
precisely by a material reduction in market liquidity.
These changes in the nature of finance have several important
implications for the supervisors and those responsible for
market oversight. Financial innovation will, in some ways,
always move ahead of the evolution in risk management techniques.
As supervisors, our challenge is to work to ensure that the
sophistication of the supervisory process evolves to keep
abreast of the pace of change in financial innovation. This
is a formidable challenge, and we need to continue to work
hard at it. The revisions to the Basel Capital Accord, which
aim to align supervisory assessments of capital adequacy more
closely with the frontier of risk management techniques, are
a good example of these efforts.
The changes in the structure of finance and the nature of
the financial intermediation process reinforce the importance
of cooperation between supervisory authorities. The sources
of potential risk to financial stability are not confined
to banks. Financial institutions increasingly operate across
the legal parameters that define the responsibilities of the
individual supervisory authorities. The economic characteristics
of many of the financial credit instruments provided by banks
and other financial institutions have converged. Our supervisory
system is a complex framework in terms of the number of responsible
supervisory institutions, differences in approaches, overlaps,
and gaps. This complexity makes it even more important that
we collectively work to ensure a comprehensive look at sources
of systemic risk and that we raise the bar on the quality
of supervision and market oversight where it is necessary.
Bank supervisors have made significant progress in improving
how we share and divide responsibilities for supervision of
banks and bank holding companies, reduce overlap, and raise
the overall contribution of the examination process. With
the passage of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act in 1999, and the
increased scope of activities it has allowed financial institutions
to engage in across the financial services industry, we have
worked to strengthen cooperation with other regulatory bodies.
This will be increasingly important to the effectiveness of
the overall supervisory process, as the SEC moves toward providing
a form of consolidated supervision for the largest securities
firms.
At the international level, we have made considerable progress
in developing a network for cooperation and information sharing
among national authorities that better matches the increased
integration of national financial systems. We have worked
to clarify the division of labor among supervisors of institutions
with supra-national reach, and to cover gaps in the supervisory
overlay. We have also worked to identify and promote the adoption
of best practices and standards for many dimensions of the
institutional framework that underpins well-functioning financial
markets. Strengthening home-host supervisory cooperation and
avoiding duplication of supervisory efforts will continue
to be top priorities for the international supervisory community,
especially as we adopt newer supervisory approaches, such
as Basel II.
Finally, we need to continue to promote investments in strengthening
resilience in critical infrastructure in payments and settlement
systems and those institutions that play an important role
in market clearance systems. This is a critical part of the
supervisory and market oversight process we perform, and there
is an active public-private effort underway to bring about
further improvements in back-up facilities and overall resilience.
The innovations that have transformed finance over the past
decade have substantially improved the overall stability and
resilience of the U.S. financial system. But these improvements
are unlikely to have brought an end to what Charles Kindleberger
called “manias and panics” in financial markets.
They cannot fully insulate the financial system from the effects
of large macroeconomic shocks. And they will not by themselves
preclude the possibility of failure in a major financial institution
or a critical piece of market infrastructure. For these reasons,
it is important that those of you who run financial institutions
build in a sufficient cushion against adversity.
Of course, the overall performance of the financial system
and the degree of financial stability depends on more than
just the skill of risk managers and supervisors. The unique
strengths of the U.S. financial system in allocating capital
to where long run returns are highest depend on the overall
confidence investors have in the fairness and integrity of
our financial markets. These strengths depend on our openness
to competition and the opportunities and rewards to innovation
that the regulatory environment provides.
The stability of the financial system also depends significantly
on the quality of macroeconomic policy, not only in terms
of the credibility of monetary policy, but also in the degree
of confidence investors have in U.S. fiscal management. The
current deterioration in the U.S. fiscal position and the
acute decline in the net national savings rate represent risks
to the financial system and the economy as a whole. These
risks are magnified by the size of the U.S. external imbalance
and the unprecedented scale of financing requirements it reflects.
Although the present economic environment looks quite favorable,
these broader macroeconomic policy challenges make it even
more important that we build on the substantial progress we
have already made in strengthening risk management and the
resilience of critical market infrastructure. Our success
in meeting these challenges will help ensure that our financial
system proves as resilient in the future as it has in the
recent past.
Thank you.
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