Staff Reports
Rollover Risk as Market Discipline: A Two-Sided Inefficiency
February 2013  Number 597
Revised April 2013
JEL classification: G21, G24, G32, G01

Author: Thomas M Eisenbach

Why does the market discipline that banks face seem too weak during good times and too strong during bad times? This paper shows that using rollover risk as a disciplining device is effective only if all banks face purely idiosyncratic risk. However, if banks’ assets are correlated, a two-sided inefficiency arises: Good aggregate states have banks taking excessive risks, while bad aggregate states suffer from fire sales. The driving force behind this inefficiency is an amplifying feedback loop between asset liquidation values and market discipline. This feedback loop operates in both good and bad aggregate states, but with opposite effects.

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